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GOD AND WOMAN IN THE CATHOLIC HOSPITAL
Leonard J. Nelson, HP1*
I. INTRODUCTION
Women's religious orders founded and fostered the development of most Catholic
hospitals in the United States. Ironically, issues related to a woman's reproductive
rights may provide the most difficult challenges to their ongoing struggles to preserve
Catholic identity. Catholic hospitals in the United States currently endure vigorous
attacks from well-organized liberal pro-choice groups1 that seek to force such hospitals
to provide access to a full range of "reproductive health services." 2 Articles in popular
magazines contend that the Catholic character of particular hospitals prevents them
from adequately serving the reproductive needs of their communities.3 In response to
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1. Cf. WILLIAM SALETAN, BEARING RIGHT: HOW CONSERVATIVES WON THE ABORTION WARS (2003).
Saletan distinguishes between liberal pro-choice activists, who advocate public funds for abortion and oppose
parental consent laws, from more conservative pro-choice supporters, who support access to abortion but not
the use of public funds and favor parental consent laws. He concludes that the position of conservative pro-
choice supporters prevails in the political arena.
2. The term "reproductive health services" remains as a controversial and tendentious term. In the
international law context, people use this term to promote increased access to abortion, contraception, and
sterilization. See Father Robert Araujo, Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Self Determination: The Meaning of
International Law, 24 FORDHAM INT'L. L. J. 1477, 1508 (2001). Generally, those working in the Catholic
natural law tradition would not consider abortion, contraception and sterilization as "reproductive health
services" because they prevent reproduction. In January of 2003, the Vatican announced plans to publish a
"Lexicon of the Family and Life" that would include a glossary of terms intended to clarify sexual and
reproductive issues. In an interview concerning the glossary, Cardinal Trujillo particularly "took issue with
the term 'reproductive rights,' which he said is not used to promote right of reproduction, but the right of
abortion." Jennifer Harper, Vatican Writes 'Glossary' on Sex Terminology, WASHINGTON TIMES, January 17,
2003, at Al.
3. See, e.g., Leslie Laurence, The Hidden Health Threat That Puts Every Woman at Risk, REDBOOK,
July 1, 2000, available at 2000 WL 18879371. This article states:
Abortion isn't the only procedure banned by hospitals under Catholic control. Prescribing birth
control (even to treat endometriosis and ovarian cysts), performing surgery to sterilize men and
women who've completed their families, treating infertility with in vitro fertilization and artificial
insemination-all these procedures can become off-limits. Medical schools affiliated with
Catholic hospitals can't train students to perform abortions or do research on fetal tissue. Doctors
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intense lobbying by liberal pro-choice groups, several states adopted laws that require
Catholic hospitals to provide emergency contraception for rape victims.4 These same
groups also lobby to promote state legislation that would mandate employers to include
contraceptive coverage in health insurance policies with limits on the ability of religious
organizations to avoid the mandate. 5 Some Catholic leaders believe the "true goal [of
the contraceptive coverage mandate] is to set the stage for mandated coverage of all so-
called reproductive services, including abortion."
' 6
In a report issued in 2002, the American Civil Liberties Union's Reproductive
Freedom Project called for legislation that would require Catholic hospitals to provide
access to a full range of reproductive services. 7  In 1997, Senator Boxer and
Representative Pelosi introduced legislation in Congress to require all hospitals that
receive federal monies to provide a full range of reproductive health services. 8 Some
states considered legislation to force Catholic hospitals to provide either abortion
referrals or abortions.
9
Politicians, especially Democrats, increasingly welcome demands for legislation
that would require Catholic hospitals to provide reproductive health services to their
patients and coverage of such services to their employees. While the Catholic Church
typically disagrees with the Democratic Party over issues such as abortion, they agree
on many other social justice issues. 10  Traditionally, Catholic voters formed an
important part of the New Deal Democrat coalition, and leading Democrats had a close
relationship with Church leaders. Now the Democratic Party is a party of abortion
rights, and Democrat politicians appear willing to confront the Catholic Church through
treating patients who have refused "extraordinary measures" at the end of their lives can't
withdraw feeding tubes.
Id. The unwillingness of Catholic hospitals to provide certain services, as well as the mixture of religion and
health care, concerns the author of this Redbook article. She quotes a psychiatrist who practices at a clinic in
Minnesota that considered a merger with the prestigious St. Mary's Medical. That hospital's customs of
offering prayers over the loudspeaker and placing crucifixes in the patient rooms offended the psychiatrist,
and the psychiatrist further states: "Thoughtful Catholics recognize that it is not hospitable or charitable to
use the vulnerability of an illness as an occasion to proselytize for a religious viewpoint." Id.
4. See, e.g., 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 382 (A.B. 1860) (West); N.Y. PUB. HEALT1H LAW § 2805-p
(McKinney 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.41.350 (West 2004).
5. John Burger, Mandatory Contraceptive Coverage: Is Abortion Next?, NAT'L CATH. REG., February
17, 2002, available at http://www.ncregister.com/RegisterNew/02202con.htm.
6. Id. (quoting Cathleen Cleaver, Director of Planning and Information for the Pro-Life Secretariat of
the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops).
7. RELIGIOUS REFUSALS AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, ACLU REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM PROJECT
(2002), available at http://www.aclu.org/Files/OpenFile.cfm?id=10943.
8. William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations Upon Autonomous Moral Choices in
Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 455, 516 (2001). This bill carried the title "The
Family Planning and Choice Protection Act," H.R. 2525; S. 1208 (103rd Congress).
9. Jim Holman, GOP and Latino Dems to the Rescue, SAN FRANCISCO FAITH, July/August 1999,
available at http://www.sffaith.com/ed/articles/1999/0799an.htm. In 1999, the California State Assembly
defeated by a vote of 31 to 39 a bill proposed by Assemblywoman Sheila Kuhl (D-Santa Monica) that would
require Catholic hospitals to provide abortions or abortion referrals. If they failed to do so, then the hospitals
would not receive public bond financing or Cal-Mortgage loan insurance. Five Latino Democrats voted
against the bill, and defeated it.
10. Remarks of Rev. Brian Hehir, Th.D., Professor, Harvard Divinity School, in Finding Common
Ground in a Pluralist Society: Catholic Providers Seek Ways to Maintain Catholic Identity in the Face of
Opposition to their Stands on Reproduction and Physician-Assisted Suicide, SPECIAL REPORT: THE 83RD
CATHOLIC HEALTH ASSEMBLY, HEALTH PROGRES, July-Aug. 1998, available at
http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP9807&ARTICLE=AI.
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legislation that requires Catholic institutions to provide reproductive health services in
violation of Catholic ethical norms. 1I It may appear difficult for Church leaders to
accept that Democrats, and in some instances Catholic Democrat politicians, support
legislation that could directly force Church agencies to violate Church teaching.
Abortion is widely available in specialized clinics and some non-Catholic hospitals.
However, this is insufficient for liberal pro-choice activists who seek to make abortion
services available in Catholic hospitals.12 As Professor Lynn Wardle noted, there exists
a shift in tactics by liberal pro-choice activists. Originally they "argued that they
merely desired to give women the private choice to select abortion," but now, "they try
to compel hospitals, clinics, provider groups, and health care insurers to provide
facilities, personnel, and funding for abortion."' 13  In a 1998 panel discussion on
Catholic Identity, sponsored by the Catholic Health Association, Father Brian Hehir,
then a Professor at Harvard Divinity School, noted, "A fundamental disagreement
between Catholic providers and their opponents is whether reproductive choices should
be public or private issues." 14 Mary Healey-Sedutto, Director of Health and Hospitals,
Archdiocese of New York, another participant in this panel discussion, articulated her
comments more specifically. In referring to bills pending at the time in the New York
legislature that would have required Catholic hospitals to provide a full range of
reproductive health services in violation of Catholic teachings, she stated:
11. Tony Quinn, Democrats: A Loyal Constituency Is Restless, Los ANGELES TIMES, January 6, 2002,
available at 2002 WL 2444130. This article notes:
But the real political damage for Democrats may lie in Church leaders' accusations that the
legislation smacks of officially endorsed bigotry against Catholics. They assert the pope was
ridiculed and the church compared to a witch's coven as the bill moved through the Legislature.
Church leaders also worry that the bill is part of a larger effort by feminist groups and their
Democratic allies to force Catholic hospitals to provide abortion on demand, a matter of growing
public debate as the number of Catholic-owned hospitals increases in California... Is there any
room left in the Democratic Party for the traditionalist Catholic viewpoint? David Carlin, the
former Democratic majority leader of the Rhode Island Senate, doesn't think so. In an article titled
"How Can a Catholic Be a Democrat?", Carlin complains that his party is not only pro-abortion,
but also in favor of same-sex marriage, physician-assisted suicide, stem-cell research and even
cloning embryos. "If you're a Catholic," he writes, "how can you possibly continue to be a
Democrat when the Democratic Party can be relied on to support the rejection of Christian values
and their replacement by un-Christian or anti-Christian values?"
Id.
12. See, e.g., Abortion Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 4691, Before the House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Health, July 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 20318916, statement of Catherine Weiss,
Director of the ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project. Weiss stated:
When, however, religiously affiliated organizations move into secular pursuits-such a providing
medical care or social services to the public or running a business-they should no longer be
insulated from secular laws that apply to these secular pursuits. In the public world, they should
play by public rules. The vast majority of health care institutions-including those with religious
affiliations-serve the general public. They employ a diverse workforce. And they depend on
government funds. A recent study found that Medicare and Medicaid accounted for 46% of total
revenues to religiously affiliated hospitals in California in 1998, while unrestricted contributions,
including charitable donations from church members, accounted for only .0015% (or $15 in every
$10,000) of total revenues. These institutions ought to abide by the same standards of care and
reproductive health mandates that apply to other health care institutions.
Id.
13. Abortion Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 4691, Before the House Energy and Commerce
Subcommittee on Health, July 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 20318915 (Statement of Professor Lyn
Wardle, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University).
14. Remarks of Rev. Brian Hehir, Finding Common Ground in a Pluralistic Society, supra note 10.
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I am in shock at the rapidity with which these issues have developed. In the past
months, five bills have moved through the assembly into the senate that will
fundamentally challenge our ability to remain in healthcare... Our opponents have a
frightening and insidious strategy . . . They have learned how to use our own
strengths against us . . . They speak of their mission, of their core values, their
ministry. They attend our meetings and participate in the discussion. They praise us
with great flourish, but then move on to the one deficit: that we are preventing
society from having access to what they see as societal rights. 15
Under federal and state conscience clause legislation, individuals and institutions
enjoy protection from a requirement to perform medical procedures that they object to
such as abortion. 16 However, groups such as the ACLU contend that conscience clause
legislation gives institutions too much protection and that this results in unwarranted
restrictions in the availability of reproductive health services. 17 The groups argue that
Catholic hospitals operate in the public sector and receive public funds; therefore, they
should not impose restrictions on the availability of reproductive health services. 18 In
addition, Professor William Bassett, a canon lawyer and professor at the University of
San Francisco School of Law, argues that federal and state conscience clauses should be
reconsidered in light of the fact that many of those covered by managed care plans are
limited in their choices of hospitals. 19  Accordingly, under Professor Bassett's
approach, patients' rights of access to reproductive services trumps the rights of
religiously affiliated hospitals to refuse services unless the patient has ready access to
other facilities, and the religious hospital fully discloses in advance its ethical
restrictions.
20
Catholic hospitals are governed by the Ethical and Religious Directives for
Catholic Hospitals2 1 ("ERD"), a set of norms adopted by the National Conference of
Catholic Bishops ("NCCB") and most recently updated in 2001. Those procedures
judged morally wrong include contraception, 22 direct sterilization,23 and direct
abortion.24 In recent years, a number of laws have been proposed at the federal level
that would deny federal funds to Catholic hospitals that refuse to provide certain
reproductive health services.25 Catholic health care leaders acknowledge that linking
15. Remarks of Mary Healey-Sedutto, Ph.D., Director of Health and Hospitals, Archdiocese of New
York, Finding Common Ground in a Pluralistic Society, supra note 10.
16. RELIGIOUS REFUSALS AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, supra note 7, at 1.
17. Id. at 2.
18. Id. at 5.
19. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals, supra note 8, at 455.
20. Id. at 456 - 57.
21. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC
HEALTH CARE SERVICES (4th ed. 2001). See also Kenneth R. White, Hospitals Sponsored by the Roman
Catholic Church: Separate, Equal and Distinct, 78 MILBANK QUARTERLY 213, 216 (2000) ("The moral
responsibility of Catholic health care is outlined in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health
Care Services.").
22. United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, at 25.
23. Id. at 28.
24. Id. at 26.
25. See, e.g., H.R. 4113, 107th Cong. (2002), at 2001 Cong. US HR 4113 (cutting off federal funds to
hospitals that fail to provide emergency contraception to victims of sexual assault).
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the receipt of federal funds to the provision of reproductive services could effectively
destroy Catholic health care. 26 Simultaneously, allegations exist that Catholic hospitals
remain insincere about their commitment to provide health care to the poor and provide
less indigent care than non-Catholic facilities. 27 It remains possible that groups could
threaten Catholic hospitals with the loss of their tax-exempt status if they refuse to
provide abortions.
Liberal pro-choice groups already gained success in state legislatures. Recently,
several states passed laws that require all hospitals, including Catholic hospitals, to
provide emergency contraception to rape victims. 28 These laws could be interpreted to
require hospitals to provide services in violation of their bishop's interpretation of the
ERD. Some laws even require most Catholic organizations to provide contraceptive
coverage as part of their employee's health care plans.29 These laws could pave the
way for more sweeping legislation. If legislation can require Catholic hospitals to
provide emergency contraception for rape victims and contraceptive coverage for
employees, it might also require them to provide sterilizations and abortions to patients.
The distinctive mission of Catholic hospitals may be extinguished due to "a
confluence of powerful environmental forces." Indeed, cultural, religious, economic,
and political forces seem to work in tandem to erode the religious mission of Catholic
hospitals. Internal and external forces place the future of a distinctive Catholic health
care at risk. The interaction of these forces is particularly apparent in the attacks on
Catholic hospitals for their refusal to provide reproductive health services. This article
will focus on the ongoing struggle to preserve a distinctively Catholic health care
system in the United States in light of the increasing demands upon Catholic hospitals
to provide a full range of reproductive health services.
Part I will discuss the spate of recent laws that require Catholic hospitals to provide
contraceptive coverage to employees and emergency contraception to victims of sexual
assaults. It will review the impact of United States Supreme Court precedents that
undermined constitutional protection for Catholic hospitals and the controversy over
conscience clause legislation. It will discuss the controversy over mandated
26. Bonar Menninger, Mission & Margin, HEALTH LEADERS (Dec. 2003) available at
http://www.healthleaders.com/magazine/2003/dec/cover.php?month=dec&year-2003 (quoting Sister Mary
Roch Rocklage, chairwoman of the St. Louis based Sisters of Mercy Health System and the immediate past
chairwoman of the American Hospital Association).
27. See Catholic Hospitals and the Charity Myth, The Abortion Access Project, available at
http://www.abortionaccess.org/viewpages/php?id=168 (asserting "that Catholic hospitals actually provide
lower levels of charity care than most other hospitals").
28. See, e.g., 29 CAL. PENAL CODE § 13823.1 l(e)(1) (West 2002).
29. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2003); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221 (1) (16)
(McKinney 2003).
30. White, Hospitals Sponsored by the Roman Catholic Church, supra note 21, at 233 noting:
A confluence of powerful environmental forces at the beginning of the twenty-first century is
threatening the future of Catholic health care. A review of the research that defines, differentiates,
and describes the performance and identity measures of Catholic hospitals reveals them to be a
separate case of private, nonprofit hospital. They have experienced environmental pressures to
become isomorphic with other hospital ownership types and are equal on some dimensions. To
keep pace with the changing demands of religious sponsorship and the social role of the hospital,
Catholic hospitals continue to redefine themselves. To justify a distinct and legitimate social role,
they must begin to emphasize organizational commitments to a "Catholic" way of doing things.
Without a palpable and routinely noticeable distinctiveness, the institutions fail the "identity
challenge" of what makes them Catholic.... (citations omitted).
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contraceptive coverage. It will review a recent California Supreme Court decision
dealing with the constitutionality of a contraceptive coverage mandate, as applied to
employee health plans sponsored by Catholic institutions. Part I will also discuss a
Washington State Attorney General's Opinion that interprets Washington State and
federal law to require Catholic institutions to provide contraceptive coverage to their
employees. It will review recent legislation requiring Catholic hospitals to provide
emergency contraception, and studies on the current practices in Catholic hospitals with
respect to emergency contraception. Finally, it will review protocols on emergency
contraception developed by Catholic health care systems.
Part II will discuss the moral foundation of Catholic health care. It will review the
Catholic natural law tradition and challenges to that tradition. It will examine the
controversy among Catholic theologians over the proper role of Catholic hospitals and
the influence of the secular bioethics movement on Catholic health care. Various
versions of the ERD will be reviewed with particular attention being paid to their
treatment of abortion, contraception, and sterilization. Catholic identity will also be
discussed, with a particular focus on the threat posed to such identity by laws that may
require Catholic hospitals to violate the ERD. The current threat to the religious
identity of Catholic hospitals in the United States is perhaps the greatest in the history
of these institutions. If, ultimately, Catholic hospitals succumb to these pressures, lose
their Catholic identity, and become indistinguishable from secular institutions, health
care in the United States will become increasingly dominated by a business model that
subordinates the spiritual and moral dimensions of health care to the profit motive.
II. EXTERNAL THREATS TO CATHOLIC IDENTITY: MANDATED CONTRACEPTIVE
COVERAGE AND EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION LAWS
Catholic hospitals experience increasing governmental pressures to provide
services in violation of their core beliefs. These pressures may result from new
conditions placed on access to government funding, limitations on participation in
government programs, or extensions of state or federal regulatory authority. United
States Supreme Court precedents also make it difficult for Catholic institutions to claim
protection from such laws under the First Amendment's Free Exercise clause. In
Employment Division, Dep 't of Human Resources v. Smith,3 1 the court refused to apply
strict scrutiny to neutral laws of general applicability even if those laws carry the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Accordingly, states are no
longer required to establish a compelling interest in support of laws that result in
incidental burdens on religious practices. Subsequently, Congress adopted the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 199332 ("RFRA") to overrule Smith and restore
the compelling state interest test. However, in City of Boerne v. Flores,33 the United
States Supreme Court held RFRA unconstitutional as applied to state and local
legislation. The gutting of RFRA by the United States Supreme Court removes a
31. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 893 (1990).
32. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1489 (codified at 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (West 2003)).
33. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
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potentially significant shield against generally applicable laws that arguably violate
religious liberties. Some contend, however, that RFRA might still be valid with respect
to federal laws.
34
It remains possible that a state could pass a law that would require all hospitals to
provide reproductive services in violation of the ERD as a condition of licensure.
Indeed, as discussed infra, some states passed laws that require Catholic hospitals to
provide emergency contraception without regard to limitations set out in the ERD, while
other states passed laws that require Catholic organizations to provide contraceptive
coverage to their employees if they provide them with prescription drug coverage.
Under Smith, it may be very difficult to convince a court that such laws violate the First
Amendment. On the other hand, if the law in question appears to be motivated by
animus toward Catholics, or appears to single out Catholic institutions, then perhaps an
argument could be made under Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah.
35
This argument would show that such a law comes subject to strict scrutiny and may
violate the First Amendment. Otherwise, these laws would most likely be upheld.
Similarly, the federal government could pass a law that requires all hospitals that
receive Medicare funds to provide a full range of reproductive services. Generally,
courts uphold this sort of conditional funding restriction. For example, in Rust v.
Sullivan36 the court upheld restrictions on the activities of Title X grantees with respect
to the promotion of abortion as a family planning method. On the other hand, courts
may view legislation that requires Catholic hospitals to provide reproductive services in
violation of the ERD, in order to receive Medicare funds, as a more substantial intrusion
into the activities of the grantees than the restrictions upheld by the court in Rust. In
Rust, the grantees effectively avoided the impact of the law by segregating their
abortion activities from their other activities. In the case of Catholic hospitals, however,
the principles concerning material cooperation would still make such a mandate morally
problematic and indeed might force the institution to close.
During the past forty years, state laws that restricted access to contraception and
abortion supported by the Catholic Church on natural law grounds fared poorly before
the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, it is possible to view the series of Supreme
Court precedents that deal with issues such as contraception and abortion as motivated
by an eagerness to endorse the sexual revolution and a desire to limit Catholic power in
state legislatures. By the early 1950s, Connecticut and Massachusetts remained the
only states that continued to enforce laws banning the sale and distribution of
contraceptives. 37 Not coincidentally, both states had significant Catholic populations
34. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16 J. L & REL.
187, 193 (2001).
35. 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993) (striking law down that prohibited sacrificial killing of animals for
religious purposes where directed only at the Santeria religion).
36. 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991).
37. In 1953, McFadden wrote:
Only two states in the nation, Massachusetts and Connecticut, have had the courage to hold their
ground against the powerful influences demanding the lifting of barriers (to the advertising, sale
and distribution of contraceptives). In these two states, an adequate law exists and diligent effort is
made to enforce it. In the November 1948 election the people of Massachusetts again voted to
retain the law.
CHARLES J. MCFADDEN, MEDICAL ETHIcs 81 (3d ed. 1953).
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and an active lobby in the state legislature on behalf of Catholic interests, and thus
Catholics had the ability to thwart attempts to repeal the bans on the sale and
distribution of contraceptives.
38
Indeed, in Griswold v. Connecticut,39 rather than allow the state legislature to
continue to deal with the issue of access to contraceptives, the Court even invented a
new federal constitutional right of privacy to strike down Connecticut's ban on the sale
of contraceptives to married persons. Likewise, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,40 the Court,
relying on the Equal Protection clause, struck down a Massachusetts law that prohibited
the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried people. Similarly, at the time of Roe v.
Wade,4 1 people viewed support for restrictions on access to abortion as a Catholic issue.
Even though many states had already liberalized their abortion laws, the Court seemed
impatient with the rate of change. In a sweeping decision, the Court struck down all
existing state abortion laws as too restrictive. Roe may be viewed primarily as a
decision that removed the abortion issue from the state legislatures because of concern
that there remained too much Catholic influence in those bodies.
Of course, the influence of Catholic interests in legislatures witnessed a sharp
decline since the time of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe, while the influence of the pro-
choice lobby significantly increased. With the shift of cultural attitudes toward such
issues among elites, the current United States Supreme Court appears unreceptive to
arguments that state or federal laws requiring Catholic hospitals to provide reproductive
services in violation of Catholic teachings violate the First Amendment. In this context,
the Court will more than likely defer to the legislative branch because the outcomes will
embrace values shared by many members of the Court. Indeed, sexual autonomy seems
to enjoy a preferred constitutional status in the eyes of the current court.4 2 Further,
conservative justices gave us Smith and Rust. The combination of liberal, pro-sexual
autonomy justices with conservative justices deferential to legislatures and hostile to
unconstitutional condition arguments appear difficult to overcome.
Moreover, the judicial commitment to sexual autonomy as a favored right, when
coupled with the de-emphasis of religious free exercise rights, does not bode well for
Catholic hospitals that seek to follow the ERD. It appears clear that Smith diluted the
Free Exercise Clause. The states remain free to pass neutral laws of general application
that substantially restrict religious activity by individuals and groups as long as those
laws contain some rational basis. Indeed, as Professor Hitchcock has noted, some
influential commentators and Supreme Court justices have viewed religious liberty as a
38. DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY 1-195 (1994) (discussing Catholic opposition to repeal
or amend Massachusetts and Connecticut laws banning sale and distribution of contraceptives).
39. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
40. 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972).
41. 410 U.S. 113 (1972). At the time of Roe, evangelical Protestant denominations remained uninvolved
in the pro-life movement. In fact, the Southern Baptist Convention initially embraced the pro-choice position
and only passed its first pro-life resolution in the early 1980s. In 1971 and 1974, the Southern Baptist
Convention had adopted a resolution that endorsed the availability of abortion in cases of rape, incest, fetal
deformity and potential damage to the physical or mental health of the mother. In 2003, the Southern Baptist
Convention adopted a resolution expressly repudiating its earlier pro-choice stance. Tom Strode, Resolution
Repudiates Early Abortion Stance, FLORIDA BAPTIST WITNESS (June 26, 2003), available at
http://www.floridabaptistwitness.com/1 104.article.print; Richard Land, Thirty Years Later: Southern Baptists
and Roe v. Wade, available at http://www.nrlc.org/news/2003/NRL07/30_yearsjater.htm.
42. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
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potential threat to secular liberal democracy. 43 It also appears that many members of
the United States Supreme Court regard traditional Catholic views on human sexuality
as primitive and perhaps even malicious. In any conflict between religious groups and
persons who advocate personal autonomy in sexual matters, it remains probable that the
Court favors advocates of sexual autonomy. Similarly, in the current context, it
probably favors patient's rights in matters that pertain to sexuality, like access to
reproductive services, over the interests of Catholic health care institutions in
continuing to observe the religiously-based restrictions found in the ERD. Accordingly,
it would not be surprising for the Court to uphold laws that require Catholic hospitals to
provide reproductive services contrary to their core religious beliefs.
Currently, under federal and state conscience clause legislation, individuals and
institutions are protected from performing medical procedures that they object to, such
as abortion. In 1973, responding to Roe v. Wade, Congress passed the Church
Amendment, the original federal conscience clause legislation.44  According to
Professor Bassett, the legacy of Bradfield v. Roberts45 is one of federal and state
governments that treat Catholic health care as an essentially secular enterprise eligible
for the receipt of government funding.46 This view of Catholic health care necessitated
the enactment of conscience clause protections in the aftermath of Roe v. Wade in order
to prevent the courts from using the receipt of federal funds as a basis for requiring
Catholic hospitals to provide abortions.
47
The Church Amendment prohibits courts and public officials from requiring
recipients of federal funds under three specific programs to perform abortions or
sterilizations, if that would be contrary to their religious or moral beliefs. 48  Its
constitutionality has been upheld against an Establishment Clause claim.49  In 1996,
Congress passed the Coats Amendment, legislation that prohibits the government from
discriminating against medical residency programs that lose accreditation because they
fail to provide abortion training.50  In 1997, Congress expanded conscience clause
protection to Medicaid managed plans so that they could refuse to provide services or
referrals for services they objected to on moral and religious grounds.
5 1
Notwithstanding these laws, Professor Wardle questions whether existing conscience
43. James Hitchcock, The Enemies of Religious Liberty, FIRST THINGS, February 2004, at 26. See also
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599- 609 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion
and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 195 (1992).
44. 42 U.S.C. A. § 300a-7 (West 2004).
45. 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
46. Bassett, Private Religious Hospital, supra note 8, at 548.
47. Id.
48. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300a-7 (West 2004).
49. Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308, 312 (9th Cir. 1974) (relying on Church
Amendment; dismissing civil rights lawsuit against Catholic hospital that received Hill-Burton funds brought
by woman who was refused sterilization; rejecting establishment clause claim) discussed in Bassett, Private
Religious Hospitals, supra note 8, at 554.
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 238n (West 2004). This legislation passed in response to St. Agnes Hospital v.
Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319, 332 (D. Md. 1990) (upholding withdrawal by Accreditation Council for Graduate
Medical Education of accreditation of Catholic hospital's residency program in obstetrics and gynecology
because of failure to provide training in elective abortions, sterilizations and contraception; finding ACGME
is state actor but rejecting free exercise claim after determining there is a compelling state interest in
providing this type of training).
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396u-2 (3) (B) (West 2004).
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clause protections provide adequate protection for religiously affiliated health care
institutions.
52
In September of 2002, in anticipation of attempts to narrow the conscience clause
exemptions, the House passed H.R. 4691, legislation designed to expand the Coats
Amendment. 53  The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops ("USCCB")
supported this legislation in order to make it clear "that the term 'health care entity' in
existing law includes the full range of participants involved in providing health care,
such as health care professionals, health plans, hospitals and other health facilities."'54 It
did not pass in the Senate, and was reintroduced in both houses in 2003.55 The USCCB
deemed this legislation necessary in order to "counteract efforts to make all care
providers perform abortions."' 56 Under Supreme Court precedents, conscience clause
legislation such as this is probably not constitutionally mandated. On the other hand,
such legislation appears not to violate the Establishment Clause.
Groups such as the ACLU, however, contend that conscience clause legislation
gives institutions too much protection resulting in unwarranted restrictions in the
availability of reproductive services. In testifying against H.R. 4691, Catherine Weiss,
Director of the ACLU's Reproductive Freedom Project, noted that the legislation could
"thwart" the enforcement of state and local laws that require entities certified or
licensed by the state to address the full range of health care needs in the communities
they serve." 57 She continued by clarifying, "A state might be prevented.., from denying
a 'certificate of need'.., to a newly merged hospital that refused to provide even
lifesaving abortions... .'58 In an attempt to refute this argument, the USCCB issued a
fact sheet that notes that approximately fourteen percent of hospitals currently provide a
52. According to Professor Wardle:
Existing conscience clause laws are inadequate as drafted for at least five major reasons. First,
most are very narrow in terms of the practices, procedures or contexts in which they apply-most
were drafted with abortion and sterilization in mind and go no further. Second, many of them are
very narrow and restrictive, covering only a small group of health care providers, not workers in
the health care industry generally. Third, the scope of protection (the discrimination forbidden) is
limited. Fourth, the remedies and procedures. for vindicating the rights are undeveloped and
restricted. Fifth, most of the laws are outdated, having been written before many of the medical
developments occurred that have created some of the most difficult moral dilemmas.
7/11/02 Cong. Testimony, available at 2002 WL 20318915.
53. H.R. 4691, 107th Cong. (2002) (passed the House September 25, 2002). As amended, it read:
The Federal Government, and any State or local government that receives federal financial
assistance, may not subject any health care entity to discrimination on the basis that - (1) the entity
refuses to undergo training in the performance of induced abortions, to require or provide such
training, to perform, provide coverage of, or pay for induced abortions, or to provide referrals for
such training or such abortions; (c) Definitions: For purposes of this section:.. .(2) The term
"health care entity" includes an individual physician or health professional, a postgraduate
physician training program, a participant in a program of training in the health care professions, a
hospital, a provider sponsored organization, a health insurance plan, or any other kind of health
care facility, organization or plan.
Statement of Catherine Weiss, supra note 12.
54. Letter from Gail Quinn, Executive Director, Secretariat for Pro-Life Activities, United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops (July 2, 2002) available at
http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/abortion/andah.htm.
55. S. 1397, 108th Cong. (2003), 2003 US. S. 1397; H.R. 3664, 108th Cong. (2003).
56. Letter from Gail Quinn, supra note 54.
57. Statement of Catherine Weiss, supra note 12.
58. Id.
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full range of abortion services and thus, "If states denied licenses and certification to all
hospitals that fail to provide the 'full range' of abortions, our health care system would
disappear.' 59 The fact sheet further notes, "the vast majority of states already have their
own conscience laws that would prevent the enforcement of such a coercive and
harmful policy."
60
Weiss further argued, "Because it does not define the term 'abortion', H.R. 4691
could permit health care entities to refuse to provide emergency contraception, even to
victims of rape." 61  Again, the USCCB's fact sheet refutes this argument noting,
"Because H.R. 4691 does not provide its own definition of 'abortion' or
'contraception,' it does not change the current federal policy of classifying the morning-
after pill as 'postcoital emergency contraception.'62
A. The Controversy over Mandated Contraceptive Coverage
Legislation proposed in Congress "would require prescription drug benefits in all
health plans to cover the pill, IUD, diaphragm, Norplant, Deprovera and emergency
contraception. Gail Quinn, Executive Director of the USCCB's Secretariat for Pro-
life Activities, in a letter to the Senate Health, Education, Labor and Pensions
Committee, stated that such a bill would "force church entities to end all prescription
drug benefits if they are to avoid violating their fundamental moral and religious
teaching on the dignity of human procreation." 64
In recent years, a number of states passed statutes or adopted regulations that
require employers and insurers to provide contraceptive coverage.65  Some states
59. FACT SHEET: ACLU's MISREPRESENTATIONS ABOUT THE ABORTION NON-DISCRIMINATION ACT,
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, SECRETARIAT OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVITIES, June 3, 2003,
available at http://www.usccb.org/prolife/issues/abortion/aclufact.htm.
60. Id.
61. STATEMENT OF CATHERINE WEISS, supra note 12.
62. FACT SHEET, supra note 59, citing 62 Fed. Reg. 8609 (Feb. 25, 1997).
63. Equity in Prescription Insurance and Contraceptive Coverage Act (EPICC), H.R. 2727, 108th Cong.
(2003); S. 1396, 108th Cong. (2003); see also Contraceptive Plans Threaten Right to Choose What's Right,
NATIONAL CATHOLIC REGISTER, Sept. 8, 2002, at 1,12.
64. Contraceptive Plans Threaten Right to Choose, supra note 63, at 12.
65. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-826 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1057.08 (2002); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. § 20-1402 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-1404 (2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 20-2329 (2002); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2003); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West 2003); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 18, § 3559 (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6 (Michie 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431: 10A-
116.6 (Michie 2002); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 431:IOA-116.7 (2002); IOWA CODE ANN. § 514C.19 (West
2001); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2332-J (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2756 (West
2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2847-G (West 2002); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 4247 (West
2002); MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 15-826 (2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47W (West 2003); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176A, § 8W (West 2003); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176B, § 4W (West 2003); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 376.1199 (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 689A.0415 (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN § 689A.0417 (MICHIE 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 689B.0376 (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN
§ 689B.0377 (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 695B.1916 (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN §
695B.1918 (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 695C.1694 (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN §
695C.1695 (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 695C.1717 (Michie 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
415:18-i (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-A:17-c (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-B:8-gg (2002);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-22-42 (Michie 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-46-44 (Michie 2002); N.Y. INS. LAW
§ 3221(1)(16) (McKinney 2003); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303 (McKinney 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-178
(2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-19-48 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-20-43 (2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-41-59
(2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §48.43.065 (West 2003); see also
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adopted mandates without any conscience clause limitations thereby requiring religious
employers to provide coverage notwithstanding their religious objections. 66  Smith
would probably consider these laws as neutral laws of general application and thus not
vulnerable to constitutional challenge. 67 Other states provided "broad exemptions" that
cover all religious organizations. 68  A few states passed legislation that requires
employer health plans to provide coverage for prescription contraceptives with more
narrowly drawn conscience clauses.69 In some instances, the application of these laws
to Catholic institutions is based upon a narrowing of protection under conscience clause
legislation by distinguishing between secular activities and religious activities. 70 While
a Catholic parish could satisfy these requirements, a Catholic hospital could not.
Naturally, these laws remain problematic for Catholic hospitals.
Cathleen Cleaver, Director of Planning and Information for the USCCB's
Committee on Pro-life Activities recently noted with respect to mandated contraceptive
coverage laws, "There seems to be a nationwide push by groups like the American Civil
Liberties Union and Planned Parenthood. We believe their true goal is to set the stage
for mandated coverage of all so-called reproductive services, including abortion."
7 1
Indeed, if such acts are construed to include coverage for emergency contraceptives that
could act as abortifacients, then the line between abortion and contraception becomes
illusory. Moreover, if legislatures can force Catholic hospitals to provide contraceptive
coverage for employees under their health plans, it comes easier to argue that they
Inimal M. Chettiar, Contraceptive Coverage Laws: Eliminating Gender Discrimination or Infringing on
Religious Liberties, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1867, 1877, fi. 68 (2002) (listing statutes from 19 states).
66. Chettiar lists four states with no religious exemption: Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-59.6 (2003);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 514C.19 (West 2001); New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415:18-i (2002); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 420-A:17-c (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4 2 0-B:8-gg (2002); Vermont: VT. STAT,
ANN. tit. 8, § 4099c (2002). Chettiar, supra note 65, at 1878 fns. 74 - 77.
67. Chettiar, supra note 65, at 1882-84.
68. Chettiar lists the following states with laws of "broad exemptions": Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
18, § 3559 (2003); Maryland: MD. CODE ANN. INS. § 15-826 (2002); Missouri: MO. ANN. STAT.§
376.1199(4) (2004); Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 689A.0415(5) (Michie 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN §
689A.0417(5) (MICHIE 2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN § 689B.0377 (5) (Michie 2002).
69. Chettiar lists nine states that provide exemptions based on religiously based objections but further
provide a "detailed definition of which employers qualify for the exemption." She further breaks these
"selective exemption" into three categories: (1) four states (Rhode Island, Connecticut, Massachusetts and
Maine) limiting the exemption to "churches as defined in Section 3121 (w) of the Internal Revenue Code";
(2) four states (North Carolina, Hawaii, California, and Arizona) focusing on "the purpose of the organization
and the people involved in it"; and (3) Washington State's "unique"exemption. Chettiar, supra note 65, at
1880-81.
70. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2003); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3221 (1) (16)
(McKinney 2003). For example, the New York law provides that "every group or blanket policy which
provides coverage for prescription drugs shall include coverage for the cost of contraceptive drugs or devices
.... .Although the law provides an exemption for religious employers, this exemption is narrowly drawn. It
provides:
For purposes of this subsection, a "religious employer" is an entity for which each of the following
is true: (a) the inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity. (b) The entity primarily
employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity. (c) The entity serves primarily
persons who share the religious tenets of the entity. (IV) The entity is a nonprofit organization as
described in Section 6033(a)(2)(A) I or iii, of the Internal Revenue Code.
The exemption in the California law is identical to the New York law.
71. John Burger, Mandatory Contraceptive Coverage-Is Abortion Next?, NATL. CATH. REG., Feb. 17,
2002 - Feb. 23, 2002, available at http://www.ncregister.com/RegisterNews/022002con.htm quoting
Cathleen Cleaver.
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ought to be required to provide a full range of reproductive health services to the
community.
1. The California Contraceptive Coverage Case
In Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court,72 the Supreme Court
of California upheld the constitutionality of the Women's Contraception Equity Act
(WCEA), a law that requires most Catholic institutions, including Catholic hospitals, to
provide their employees with contraceptive coverage if they provide prescription drug
coverage. The California Supreme Court's decision is unprecedented insofar as it
upholds a state law that requires Catholic organizations to choose between providing
contraceptive coverage for their employees, an act that violates a longstanding Catholic
moral teaching, or discontinuing a prescription drug benefit for its employees, a benefit
that such organizations are obligated to provide under Catholic social justice teaching.
73
It remains a particularly portentous decision for Catholic hospitals because if the
government can require Catholic hospitals to provide contraceptive coverage for their
employees, including perhaps even coverage for abortifacient drugs, then only a
relatively small step remains to require them to provide a full range of reproductive
services for patients.
In its rejection of Catholic Charities' Free Exercise claims, the Court noted that
Smith would ordinarily preclude such claims. 74  Indeed, this decision illustrates the
difficulty for a religious organization in the post-Smith era in resisting a supposedly
neutral law of general application that forces it to violate a core belief. The majority
opinion of the California Supreme Court illustrates a generally dismissive attitude
towards Catholic Charities' constitutional arguments. It relies on Smith in rejecting
Catholic Charities' claims and focuses on what it views as the benign purpose of the
law: reducing gender discrimination and extending contraceptive coverage to the ten
percent of women not currently provided contraceptive coverage from commercial
insurers. 75 Both the Court's decision and the legislative mandate evince disdain for
traditional Catholic moral teaching on contraception. Unfortunately, the case sets a
troubling precedent particularly for Catholic hospitals-under its reasoning a state law
requiring all hospitals, including Catholic hospitals, to provide abortion services would
probably withstand constitutional scrutiny.
76
The WCEA requires that health and disability insurance policies that provide
coverage for prescription drugs must also cover prescription contraceptive drugs. 7 7 The
72. 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied 2004 WL 2050815 (2004).
73. Petitioner's brief notes: "In our examination of the legal history of the United States, we have found
not a single instance in which courts have held it constitutional to compel a religious institution directly to
fund, in its own internal operations for its own employees conduct that it condemns as sinful." Petitioner's
Brief on the Merits, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL 1700664, at *13.
74. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 81.
75. Id. at 74.
76. See Petitioner's Reply Brief, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2002 WL
985448, at *1.
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25 (West 2004) (governing group health service plan
contracts); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West 2004) (governing individual and group disability insurance
policies). These two statutes are virtually identical.
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act includes a narrowly drawn religious exemption that permits a "religious employer"
to avoid the mandate, but attempts to distinguish between Church activities that are
essentially secular and those that are religious. 78 In order to qualify for the "religious
employer" exemption, these laws require an organization to state as its purpose "the
inculcation of religious values," to employ primarily persons who share its "religious
tenets," to serve primarily persons who share its "religious tenets," and to be
incorporated under the particular provisions of the Internal Revenue Code referenced in
the statute. 79  Catholic Charities acknowledged that it did not meet any of these
criteria.80 Although the mandate could be avoided by not providing any prescription
drug coverage for employees, Catholic Charities argued it had a moral obligation to
provide such coverage under Catholic teaching.
8 1
Although not expressly relied upon by the court and questioned by the appellant's
brief, it is possible that portions of the legislative history indicating that many Catholic
institutions in California, including several hospitals and the Diocese of Sacramento,
were already providing contraceptive coverage to their employees may have seriously
undermined the claim that this legislation significantly infringes the religious freedom
of Catholic institutions. 82 It is also possible that in light of the pattern of widespread
dissent on the issue of contraception within the Church, neither a majority of the
Supreme Court of California nor the members of the California State Legislature who
voted for the law believed that the objection to providing such benefits was sincere and
well-founded. In addition, the court was undoubtedly influenced by the characterization
in the State's brief of Catholic hospitals and universities as "secular" organizations that
are only "loosely affiliated" with the Catholic Church thereby further undermining the
argument that the contraceptive coverage mandate significantly impinged upon
religious freedom. 83  Finally, the impact of Catholic Charities' First Amendment
78. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1) (West 2004) provides:
b) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a religious employer may request a health
service plan contract without coverage for federal Food and Drug Administration approved
contraceptive methods that are contrary to the religious employers religious tenets. Ifso requested,
a health care service plan contract shall be provided without coverage for contraceptive methods.
1) For purposes of this section a 'religious employer' is an entity for which each of the
following is true:
A) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the entity.
B) The entity primarily employs persons who share the religious tenets of the entity.
C) The entity serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets of the entity.
D) The entity is a nonprofit organization as described in Section 6033(a)(2)(A) i or iii,
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
See also CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(d) (West 2004).
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.25(b)(1) (West 2004); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(d) (West
2004).
80. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 75.
81. Id. at 75.
82. See, e.g., Petition for Review, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL
170664 at *10 note 11 (summarizing legislative history). In its brief, Catholic Charities characterizes these
assertions as incorrect, but fails to provide any specific data on the numbers of Catholic organization that
provide such coverage for their employees. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67
(No. S099822), available at 2001 WL 170664, at *39.
83. Real Parties in Interest Answer Brief on the Merits, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822),
available at 2002 WL 985444, at *4. The State's brief further argues:
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arguments was undoubtedly blunted by the counter-argument that the mandate could be
avoided by simply dropping all prescription drug coverage for employees and
increasing their compensation.
84
In this case, the Superior Court rejected Catholic Charities' claim that the
contraceptive mandate was unconstitutional and denied its motion for a preliminary• • . 85
injunction. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Superior Court's holding that the
challenged law violated neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clauses of the
First Amendment. 86  Subsequently, the California Supreme Court granted review.
87
Catholic Charities raised several issues in its Petition for Review including Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause claims under the United States Constitution as well
as a claim under the California State Constitution.
88
Although it claims that 'Catholic Charities is part of the Catholic Church,' and although it is
affiliated with the Roman Catholic Bishop of Sacramento, Inc., Petitioner nevertheless is a
separately incorporated and administered organization. It is a nonprofit public benefit corporation.
Petitioner's secular legal status permits it to receive substantial public funding and to enter
contracts with public agencies.
Petitioner does not qualify for WCEA's religious employer exemption. Inculcation of religious
values is not its purpose; it does not primarily employ or serve persons who share its religious
tenets; and it is not a nonprofit religious organization within the terms of IRC section 6033(a)(2)
(A) (i) or (iii). In fact, most of Petitioner's 183 employees are not Catholic, and the humanitarian
services Petitioner provides are offered without regard to the religious affiliation of the recipients.
In short, Petitioner is legally a secular organization.
Id. at 7 (footnotes omitted)
Professor Berg argues that the most troubling of these requirements is the service requirement. He states:
An entity can be exempt only if it 'serves primarily persons who share the religious tenets on the
entity.' Catholic Charities failed because it serves any needy person, Catholic, Christian or not. An
entity can make its religious beliefs explicit, but only to people who already share the beliefs;
evangelism is unprotected, because it proclaims to nonbelievers. And, according to this view, any
social service that reaches out to the world loses its ability to maintain its religious identity. Teach
and minister among yourselves in your insular community-in the catacombs. But once you serve
the larger society, you no longer may draw lines of conscience on what you will and will not
support.
Thomas C. Berg, Religious Freedom in the Catacombs, 190 Am. 17, 17-19 (2004).
84. Real Parties in Interest Answer Brief on the Merits, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822),
available at 2002 WL 98544, at *25.
85. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 76.
86. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr.2d 176 (Cal. App. 2001), pet
for rev granted, 112 Cal. Rptr.2d 258 (Cal. 2001). The Court of Appeals concluded:
[T]he prescription contraceptive coverage statutes, which were enacted to eliminate discriminatory
insurance practices that had undermined the health and economic well-being of women, are
otherwise valid laws that are generally applicable and neutral with respect to religion. Because the
statutes have a secular purpose, do not advance or inhibit religion, and do not foster excessive
entanglement with religion, the incidental effect of the statutes on religious belief does not violate
the religious guarantees of the United States and California constitutions.
Catholic Charities, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d at 181.
87. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 112 Cal. Rptr.2d 258 (Cal. 2001).
88. The following issues were set forth in the Petition for Review:
1) Whether the religious freedom guarantees enshrined in Article 1, Section 4 of the California
Constitution continue to trigger "strict scrutiny," as a matter of independent state grounds, where
the Legislature has imposed a substantial burden upon religious exercise by deliberately targeting
certain religious institutions for coercion of conduct contrary to their religious beliefs.
2) Whether a statutory exemption provision, designed by its authors and sponsors to draw explicit
and deliberate distinctions between different religious organizations for the stated purpose of




Catholic Charities made several arguments that the WCEA's mandate and its
limited exemption were unconstitutional because of interference with religious
autonomy. 89 The California Supreme Court rejected Catholic Charities' argument that
the law unconstitutionally interferes with "matters of religious doctrine and internal
church governance." 90  In this regard, it found the church property and ministerial
exception cases inapposite.9 1  Catholic Charities also argued that the legislature
improperly took sides in an internal dispute over Church doctrine on contraception
pointing to legislative history and particularly statements by Senator Speier, the primary
sponsor of the bill, noting the widespread dissent by Catholics from the Church's
teaching and urging legislators to "do the right thing" by lending their support to the
dissenters. 92  The California Supreme Court rejected the contention by Catholic
Charities that the legislature improperly took the side of Catholics who dissent from
Church teaching on contraception and specifically rejected Catholic Charities' reliance
on the comments by Senator Speier, by simply noting "the Legislature's motive cannot
reliably be inferred from a single senator's remarks." 93 But this observation ignores the
fact that Senator Speier was the moving force behind the bill in the California Senate.
94
The California Supreme Court further rejected the contention that the exemption
violates the First Amendment insofar as it distinguishes between religious and secular
activities of the Church holding that it is perfectly proper for the government to make
such a distinction for the purpose of providing an exemption designed to accommodate
religious exercise. 95  Similarly, it rejected the argument that the exemption to the
mandate violates the Establishment Clause by requiring a governmental inquiry into
religious beliefs by noting that Catholic Charities acknowledged it does not fit any of
the criteria set forth in the exemption.
96
Catholic Charities also challenged the law under the Free Exercise Clause of the
3) Whether a statutory exemption provision, which explicitly classifies eligible employers based
upon religious criteria, such as the "inculcation of religious values" and the "sharing [of] religious
tenets," and was designed by its authors and sponsors to target certain religious organizations that
they viewed as holding "particularly objectionable" religious views on the perceived problem at
issue, violates the federal Free Exercise Clause.
4) Whether a religious organization, bringing a Free Exercise Clause claim in California state
court, may invoke the 'hybrid rights' exception to the general rule enunciated in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (1990), and, if so, what standard should
California courts apply in reviewing such 'hybrid rights' claims.
Petition for Review, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL 34369289, at * 1.
89. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 76.
90. Id. at 77.
91. Id. at 76-78.
92. Petitioners Brief on the Merits, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL
1700604, at *14-15.
93. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 78. But cf Edwards v. Agullard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987) (holding
Lousiana law requiring teaching of creationism in public schools if evolution is taught violates Establishment
Clause; court focuses on statement of sponsor of bill in ascertaining its purpose); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S.
38, 43 (1985) (holding Alabama law authorizing a daily period of silence in public schools violates
Establishment Clause; court focuses on remarks of prime sponsor of bill in ascertaining its purpose).
94. Petition for Review, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL 34369289, at
*5.
95. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 79 (citing Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-40 (1978).
96. Id. at 80; but cf id. at 96 (concurring opinion by Kennard, J.) (expressing doubt as to whether it is
permissible under the Establishment Clause for California to limit religious employer exemption to religious
organizations engaged in inculcation of religious values).
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United States Constitution. 97 It argued that the WCEA should be subjected to strict
scrutiny notwithstanding Smith.98 Catholic Charities challenged the limited exemption
arguing that under Lukumi it lacked facial neutrality due to the use of religious
terminology.99 The Supreme Court rejected the Lukumi analogy on the basis that the
purpose of these references in WCEA is to provide a religious exemption rather than to
impose a burden. 100 Accordingly, the court held that Lukumi was distinguishable from
the present case because it involved the use of religious language for the purpose of
prohibiting religious activity. 101 But this seems disingenuous in light of the fact that the
primary motivating factor behind both the contraceptive mandate and the narrowly
crafted exemption was to force most Catholic institutions to provide contraceptive
coverage. Moreover, legislation requiring a religious organization to violate its core
beliefs in order to carry on a ministry that benefits the public is as burdensome as
legislation restricting religious activity.
Catholic Charities also argued that strict scrutiny should apply here because in
crafting this legislation and its narrow conscience clause, the California legislature
deliberately targeted the Catholic Church based on general antipathy toward the Church
and contempt for its position on contraception. 10 2 Catholic Charities contended that the
mandate is not a neutral or generally applicable law insofar as it specifically targets
Catholic institutions. 103 It characterized the mandate and exemption as a "religious
gerrymander" specifically designed to deny the exemption to Catholic organizations
engaged in charitable works rather than purely spiritual works.1
0 4
Catholic Charities argued that the exemption was crafted for the purpose of
excluding Catholic hospitals and social service agencies. 105 In this regard, it argued
that the purpose of the legislature in enacting the mandate and the limited exemption
was "to close a 'Catholic gap' in insurance coverage for prescription contraceptives."'
10 6
Catholic Charities focused on the legislative history to support its contention that the
legislature had "deliberately" targeted the Catholic Church. 10 7 A consultant's study
relied on by the legislature indicated that ninety percent of insured Californians already
had contraceptive coverage at the time of the legislation. 108 The CEO of Planned
Parenthood of California argued at a legislative hearing that a broadly crafted religious
97. Id. at 81.
98. Id. at 82.
99. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL
1700664, at *30.
100. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 83.
101. Id. at83.
102. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL
1700664, at *10-11, 35. (relying primarily on Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)). The Petition for
Review states "what has occurred here is unworthy of a noble democratic institution like the California
Legislature," Petition for Review, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL
34369289, at *2.
103. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 82.
104. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL
1700664, at *32.
105. Id. at *35.
106. /d. at *6-9.
107. Id.
108. Id. at *6.
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exemption would undermine the purpose of the contraceptive mandate. 10 9  On this
basis, Catholic Charities argued that the legislative history showed that the sponsors and
authors of the bill crafted a religious exemption that was specifically designed not to
cover most Catholic institutions, the only identifiable group of large employers with a
religiously-based moral objection to contraceptive coverage.110
Moreover, Catholic Charities contended the legislative history is replete with
evidence of antipathy to the Catholic Church and its position on contraception."' It
pointed to statements by sponsors of the bill noting that Catholic teaching on
contraception was archaic and not followed by most Catholics and Catholic
institutions. 112  Catholic Charities also pointed to statements made by legislators
comparing the Catholic Church to "a witches coven, a 'new age' bakery, and a
chinchilla ranch" as providing further evidence of hostility toward the Catholic
Church. 
1 13
Notwithstanding this legislative history, the California Supreme Court holds there
is no evidentiary basis for the targeting claim. 114  Specifically, the court rejected
Catholic Charities' reliance on the testimony of the Planned Parenthood representative
referring to the necessity of closing the "gap" in coverage. 115 The court says the "gap"
referred to here by the Planned Parenthood representative is the failure of some PPO
and indemnity plans to provide contraceptive coverage rather than the failure of
Catholic organizations to provide such coverage. 116  This observation by the court,
however, seems disingenuous in light of the fact that the representative refers to the
"gap" in the context of opposing an exemption that would have accommodated Catholic
hospitals and universities. 117
Catholic Charities argued that the law should be subject to strict scrutiny under the
hybrid rights doctrine because the provision of contraceptive coverage by Catholic
organizations could be viewed as an endorsement of the morality of contraception and
accordingly the law effectively forces them to engage in symbolic speech that they find
109. Id. at *7.
110. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67, available at 2001 WL 1700664, at
*7-8. The Petitioner's Brief summarizes the legislative history as follows:
The record establishes that the authors and sponsors of the bill principally wanted to "close the
gap" left by Catholic religious institutions, which are a significant and easily identifiable group of
employers with an institutional religious prohibition against offering contraceptive insurance
coverage. For the authors and sponsors, Catholic religious institutional employers were viewed as
the problem-a problem to be "dealt with" by imposing the contraceptive mandate upon them. If an
exemption were needed for constitutional or political reasons, the authors and sponsors posited,
that exemption must be deliberately fashioned to exclude Catholic hospitals, universities, and
social service agencies. Indeed, if closing the Catholic gap were not the problem, then "granting
an exemption" to Catholic employers could hardly be said to "defeat the original purpose of the
bill."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Ill. Id. at *10.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *11, n. 8.
114. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d. at 87.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL 1700664, at *7-8
(referring to testimony of Kathy Kneer, the CEO of Planned Parenthood of California, before the Senate
Insurance Committee. Testimony available at 11 DocApp A003050 - 51.).
[Vol. 3 1:1
God And Woman In The Catholic Hospital
objectionable."1 8 The Supreme Court of California summarily rejected this argument
noting that Catholic Charities is still free to voice its disapproval while providing
contraceptive coverage. 119 Nonetheless, the mandate remains problematic for Catholic
organizations including Catholic hospitals. For example, with respect to Catholic health
care institutions, Directive 70 provides, "Catholic health care institutions are not
permitted to engage in immediate material cooperation in actions that are intrinsically
immoral ... " 120 Of course, under the Catholic natural law tradition, artificial
contraception is judged to be intrinsically immoral.
121
There is also the risk of scandal that would arise from a Catholic institution
providing contraceptive coverage to its employees, and this, in and of itself, could be a
basis for the moral condemnation of any institutional compliance with a contraceptive
mandate. 122 This in turn presents Catholic organizations with a difficult dilemma -
either cease providing coverage for outpatient prescription in its employee health plan, a
violation of Catholic social teaching, or create the risk of scandal by complying with the
state's mandate. The other suggested possibility of increasing compensation so that
employees could pay for prescription drug coverage out-of-pocket may not be viable
because it may not provide affordable coverage for employees who suffer catastrophic
or chronic illnesses with very high drug costs. 
123
The California Supreme Court also rejected Catholic Charities' arguments that the
mandate was unconstitutional under the California State Constitution. 124  The court
holds that even if strict scrutiny was applicable under the California Constitution, the
law serves a compelling state interest, i.e., gender equity, and is narrowly tailored
because a broader exemption would increase those affected by discrimination.
125
Finally, Catholic Charities argued that the WCEA's limited religious exemption
could not even survive the rational basis test because its criteria is arbitrary: i.e., its
exclusion from the exemption of Church bodies providing service or employing persons
of other religions is unrelated to any state interest. 126 The Court rejected this argument
noting that the criterion requiring employment of persons of the same religion
118. Id. at *38.
119. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 89.
120. United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, at 37. The Directive goes on to give
specific examples of such intrinsically immoral acts including abortion and direct sterilization, but not
contraception.
121. JANET E. SMITH, HUMANAE VITAE: A GENERATION LATER 84 (1991) ("Contraception is intrinsically
immoral not because it violates the purpose of the reproductive organs but because it violates the procreative
meaning of sexual acts; because it violates the nature of the sexual act.").
122. United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, at 37 ("The possibility of scandal
must be considered when applying the principles governing cooperation").
123. Cf Real Parties in Interest Answer Brief on the Merits, Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 (No.
S099822), available at 2002 WL 985444, at *25-26 ("Petitioner can avoid the conflict between law and
beliefs by simply not offering any prescription drug coverage through insurance carriers and, instead, for
example, paying a stipend to employees to enable them to obtain their own prescription drug coverage.").
124. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d 67 at 81. The California Constitution provides: "Free exercise and
enjoyment of religion without discrimination or preference are guaranteed. This liberty of conscience does
not excuse acts that are licentious or inconsistent with the peace or safety of the State. The Legislature shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion." WEST'S ANN. CAL. CONST., art. 1, § 4 (2004).
125. Id. at 93-94.
126. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits, 85 P.3d 67 (No. S099822), available at 2001 WL 1700664. at *47-
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substantially overlaps with the constitutionally required ministerial exception. 127 While
it acknowledges that the requirement that the organization primarily serve those of the
same religion is problematic, it concludes that it is irrelevant because Catholic Charities
fails to satisfy any of the other criteria set forth in the exemption.
128
Justice Brown is the sole dissenter from the Court's opinion in Catholic
Charities.129  While the majority opinion finds that the freedom of religious
organizations to practice their religion is trumped by the demands of gender equity,
Justice Brown would invalidate the law in light of its restrictions on religious freedom.
She states the issue in the case as follows, "May the government impose a mandate on a
religiously affiliated employer that requires the employer to pay for contraceptives-in
violation of an acknowledged religious tenet-or to redefine what constitutes religious
conduct."' 130 She believes that Smith is not controlling in this case. 131 First, she notes
that Smith involves "the denial of a benefit to an individual because of a violation of
existing law."' 132 On the other hand, Catholic Charities involves a "law that requires a
religious organization to provide a benefit despite its theological objections."' 133 Brown
takes a much more positive view of the importance of religious liberty than does the
majority.134  She notes that while the church property and ministerial cases are
inapposite here, they are merely examples of cases within a broader category of
constitutional protection for religious organizations and not exhaustive. 135  She also
states, "Some courts have reasoned that religious institutions are exempted entirely from
the Smith analysis."'
136
Justice Brown is troubled by the exemption's distinction between religious and
secular organizations within the Church and finds it to be problematic under
Establishment Clause precedents. 137  She observes that in this case, the exemption
provisions represent an "intentional, purposeful intrusion into a religious organization's
expression of its religious tenets and sense of mission." 138 As compared with the
majority opinion, Justice Brown gives more credence to the legislative history relied on
by Catholic Charities indicating religious bias on the part of legislators. She refers to
the tension between the traditional views of the Catholic Church on human sexuality
and the predominant view that sexual autonomy is the preeminent value. 139 In this
regard, she questions the religious neutrality of the contraceptive mandate noting that
during the debates over it, the remarks of several legislators indicate that they believed
127. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 94.
128. Id. at 95.
129. Id. at 98 (Justice Brown dissenting).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 99.
132. Id.
133. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 99.
134. Id. at 100.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 99, citing to Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1303 (1 1th
Cir. 2000) (holding that ministerial exception under Title VII survives Smith).
137. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 100 (Justice Brown dissenting).
138. Id. at 102.
139. Id. at 103.
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that the Church's position was archaic. 140 Justice Brown found further evidence of the
legislature's targeting of Catholic organizations in statements by Senator Speier that
most Catholics believe that one can practice birth control and still be a good Catholic
and that Speier agreed with that position. 14 1 She also notes that the harm caused by the
state's imposition of the contraceptive mandate may greatly outweigh the benefits of the
law in light of the relatively small number of employees actually affected. 142  She
concludes that the attempt to distinguish between the religious and secular activities of
the Catholic Church is "an impermissible government entanglement in religion" and a
violation of the Establishment Clause. 143
Moreover, if the law is determined not to be religiously neutral, Justice Brown
questions whether it would pass the federal strict scrutiny test noting that the exemption
takes "such a crabbed and constricted view of religion that it would define the ministry
of Jesus Christ as a secular activity."'144 She also finds the narrow exemption "baffling"
in light of the fact that religious employers can avoid the impact of the mandate by
either dropping prescription drug coverage or self-insuring. 145  Finally, she would
invalidate the narrow exemption under the California State Constitution because of the
lack of a compelling state interest in light of evidence showing that ninety percent of
commercially insured Californians already have contraceptive coverage and that only a
small number of employees of Catholic organizations would be affected by the
mandate. 1
46
Justice Brown's views would of course be much more protective of religious
institutions against state attempts to force them to violate their core religious beliefs.
This seems more in keeping with the values underlying the First Amendment. But in
this legal culture, if the views of the religious organization in question run counter to the
prevailing orthodoxy on sexual autonomy, then they are likely to get short shrift in the
courts. It seems clear from the legislative history that the contraceptive mandate and its
narrow conscience clause were deliberately aimed at forcing Catholic institutions such
as hospitals to provide contraceptive coverage. This is particularly troubling in light of
the fact that the mandate could be construed to also include coverage of RU-486, a drug
used for the purpose of causing abortions.
147
140. Id.
141. Id. at n.3.
142. Id. at 104.
143. Catholic Charities, 85 P.3d at 105.
144. Id. (footnote omitted).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 108.
147. See Petition for Review, 2001 WL 34369289 at *12, n.13, stating:
Catholic Charities timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the trial court, arguing that the
approval of RU-486 and Kaiser's intention to add it to the formulary placed the Catholic Church in
jeopardy of being complicit in pharmaceutical abortions, masquerading in 'post-coital'
contraception .... In Catholic Charities view, this expands the issue to include what Catholic
Charities regards as abortion. On October 31, 2000, the trial court granted Catholic Charities
Motion for Reconsideration, finding that the approval of RU-486 should have been considered by
the trial court, and again denied the Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
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2. The Washington State Attorney General's Opinion
On December 14, 2001, the EEOC interpreted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to
require employers to provide contraceptive coverage when they provide prescription
drug coverage. 148 Subsequently, in Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co.,149 a federal district
court in the state of Washington held that the exclusion of prescription contraceptives
from a prescription drug plan provided by an employer violated the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. This decision was appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but later settled
and the appeal dropped. 15  Neither the EEOC ruling nor the Erickson case, however,
considered claims for exemption on the basis of religion. A 2002 Washington State
Attorney General's opinion, however, does consider the application of a contraceptive
coverage mandate to Catholic organizations and provides another example of an anti-
discrimination law trumping religious freedom.
The Washington State Attorney General Opinion relies on Erickson and the EEOC
decision in determining that "under state and federal law, offering a generally
comprehensive prescription drug plan that excludes prescription contraceptives would
constitute an unfair labor practice and is not an option for either insurance carriers or
employers."' 151 Citing the strong public policy against sex discrimination, the opinion
concludes that the failure to provide contraceptive coverage where the employer
otherwise provides prescription drug coverage is sex discrimination. 152 On this basis, it
opines that it would be an unfair labor practice for an employer to offer prescription
drug coverage, but require employees to pay an additional amount out-of-pocket for
contraceptive coverage. 153  The opinion also notes that prescription contraceptive
coverage by employers is mandated as a part of Washington State's Basic Health
Plan. 154
In the same opinion, Washington State's conscientious objection statute is narrowly
interpreted as applied to employers with a religious or moral objection to providing
contraceptive coverage. 155  Paradoxically, the opinion concludes that objecting
employers can be required to provide, but not to purchase, contraceptive coverage.156
Thus it suggests that the objecting employer can classify its cost as an overhead expense
to be included by the actuary in the calculation of the carrier's rates. 157
148. Commission Decision on Coverage of Contraception, Dec. 14, 2000, 2000 WL 33407187 (E.E.O.C.
Guidance) at *5.
149. 141 F.Supp.2d 1266 (W.D. Wash. 2001); but cf Glaubach V. Regence Blueshield, 74 P.3d 115
(Wash. 2003) (answering a certified question by holding that the failure of a health insurer to provide
coverage for all methods of contraception did not violate Washington insurance reform act).
150. The Erickson case was subsequently appealed to the 9th Circuit, but the appeal was dropped when
the Bartell Drug Company settled with a class of its female employees. Under the terms of the settlement,
Bartell agreed to provide contraceptive coverage to its employees. Sally Roberts, Plan Agrees to Cover
Contraceptive Drugs: Bartell Case was Closely Watched, BUSINESS INSURANCE, March 17, 2003, at 2003
available at WL 9137929.
151. WASH. STATE ATTY. GEN. OP. 2002, No. 5, Aug. 8, 2002, 2002 WL 31936085 (Wash. A.G.), at *7.
152. Id. at *4.
153. Id. at *1.
154. Id. referring to 2002 Basic Health Member Handbook, Appendix A, p. 26, 32.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Wash. State Atty. Gen. Op. 2002, No. 5, Aug. 8, 2002, 2002 WL 31936085 (Wash. A.G.), at *8. In
an interesting exercise in legal hairsplitting, the Attorney General Opinion goes on to conclude:
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The Washington State Attorney General Opinion was issued in response to a
request from the Insurance Commissioner for guidance on whether the statute requiring
contraceptive coverage applies to employers with a religious objection. 158 The statute
mandating contraceptive coverage contains a "conscientious objection" clause
providing that individuals or organizations with a religious or moral objection to
particular coverage may not be required to "purchase it." 159  The Washington State
Attorney General Opinion concludes that notwithstanding the "conscientious objector"
statute, a religiously affiliated employer would commit an "unfair practice" in violation
of state law if it provided prescription drug coverage without contraceptive coverage.
160
It further states:
Before closing the discussion, we note that the "conscience clause" statute.., protects
an employer exercising the option from 'purchasing' for its employees coverage to
which the employer has a conscientious objection. . . . [S]tate and/or federal law
prohibits charging the employees themselves for prescription contraceptive coverage,
even if such coverage is the subject of the employer's conscientious objection. So
long as the employer is not required to 'purchase' the coverage, however, there might
be lawful ways of covering these costs.
16 1
Subsequently, in an article in the Spokesman-Review, a Spokane, Washington
newspaper, a spokeswoman for the state insurance commissioner's office stated that
under this ruling, Sacred Heart Medical Center must provide prescription birth control
coverage for its employees. The article went on to note that the "ruling did provide a bit
Inclusion of the cost of prescription drug coverage as a component (such as administrative,
overhead, contingency, or other expense allowance) in the actuarial analysis of a carrier's rates is
therefore permissible under RCW 48.43.065 if it does not require employers to directly purchase
the health service that is objected to; ensures enrollees will not be denied coverage of, and timely
access to, any service or services excluded from their benefits package; does not require extra
payments by the enrollee to receive coverage; and does not require carriers to provide services
without "appropriate payment of premium or fee."
Id.
158. Id.
159. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 48.43.065(3) (West 2004) provides:
(a) No individual or organization with a religious or moral tenet opposed to a specific
service may be required to purchase coverage for the service or services if they object
to doing so for reason of conscience or religion.
(b) The provisions of this section shall not result in an enrollee being denied coverage of,
and timely access to, any service or services excluded from their benefits package as a
result of their employer's or another individual's exercise of the conscience clause in
(a) of this subsection.
(c) The insurance commissioner shall define by rule the process through which health
carriers may offer the basic health plan services to individuals and organizations
identified in (a) and (b) of this subsection in accordance with provisions of subsection
(2)(c) of this section.
In apparent response to the attorney general opinion, legislation was introduced in the Washington State
Senate in February 2003 to amend § (1)(b) to read: "No individual or organization with a religious or moral
tenet opposed to a specific service may be required to purchase or otherwise provide coverage for the service
or services if they object to doing so for reason of conscience or religion." 2003 WA. S.B. 5887 (SN)
(emphasis added).
160. WASH. STATE ATTY. GEN. Op. 2002, No. 5, Aug. 8,2002,2002 WL 31936085 (Wash. A.G.), at *1.
161. Id. at *7.
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of a fig leaf for employers who find contraceptives objectionable: They can ask their
insurer to wrap the costs of such coverage into overall policy costs, perhaps as an
administrative or overhead cost."' 162 In an editorial, the Spokesman-Review commented
favorably on the new ruling:
Surely, when the Sisters of Providence founded the hospital in the 19th century, they
saw their mission as repairing body and soul. But Sacred Heart has become a modem
health care conglomerate, forging partnerships with for-profit companies, accepting
government money, hiring employees without a Catholic litmus test and taking all
* patients regardless of creed.
Its makeup and mission are largely secular. Therefore, its employees have the same
rights as anyone else. 
163
B. Emergency Contraception
1. State Laws Mandating Emergency Contraception and Studies on its Availability in
Catholic Hospitals
The administration of emergency contraception methods has become the standard
of care for the treatment of female sexual assault victims. 164 The two most widely used
methods "are the combined estrogen-progestin ...and progestin only methods."
165
"Both regimes consist of two doses of contraceptive steroids taken 12 hours apart after
intercourse." 166  Under Directive 36 of the 2001 ERD, the bishops permit the
administration of emergency contraception by Catholic institutions where the woman is
a victim of sexual assault and "if, after appropriate testing there is no evidence that
conception has occurred already. ... 167 In effect, Directive 36 provides for an
exception to the traditional prohibition on the use of artificial contraception. While in
accordance with Catholic teaching, a married woman who engaged in consensual sexual
intercourse would not be permitted to resort to contraception to prevent pregnancy, a
sexual assault victim is permitted to prevent conception.168 The basis for this exception
162. Richard Roesler, Contraceptive Coverage Goes for Hospital Too, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Aug. 12,
2002, at AI.
163. Gary Crooks, Medical Center Can Find Right Balance, SPOKESMAN-REVIEw, Aug. 18, 2002, at B6.
164. Reza Keshavarz, Roland C. Merchant & John McGreal, Emergency Contraception Provision: A
Survey of Emergency Department Practitioners, 9 ACADEMIC EMERGENCY MED. 69 (2002) available at
http://www.aemj.org/cgi/content/full/9/l/69; see also Brownfield v. Daniel Freeman Marina Hospital, 208
Cal.App.3d 405 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (dismissing an action for declaratory relief brought by rape victim
against Catholic hospital for failing to provide emergency contraception medication to her or refer her,
suggesting that she might have a malpractice action).
165. David A. Grimes & Elizabeth G. Raymond, Emergency Contraception, 137 ANN. OF INT. MED. E-
180-81 (Aug. 6, 2002).
166. Id.
167. United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, at 21.
168. Kevin D. O'Rourke, Applying the Directives, 79 HEALTH PROGRESS 64 (July-Aug. 1998), available
at http://www.chausa.orgIPUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP9807&ARTICLE=E.
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is the right of the rape victim to self-defense. 169  The Directive further provides,
however, that it is not morally permissible "to initiate or recommend treatments that
have as their purpose or direct effect the removal, destruction, or interference with the
implantation of a fertilized ovum."
' 170
Federal legislation without any conscience clause limitations has been proposed
that would cut off federal funds to hospitals that do not provide emergency
contraception to female sexual assault victims.171 California recently passed a bill that
requires physicians and other health care providers to provide female victims of sexual
assaults with "postcoital contraception."'172  This legislation does not contain a
conscience clause. Similarly, Washington State law requires every hospital that treats
rape victims, including Catholic hospitals, to: (1) provide the victim accurate and
unbiased information about emergency contraception; (2) orally inform the victim that
she has the option to receive emergency contraception at the hospital, and (3) provide
emergency contraception to every victim who requests it, unless there is a medical
reason not to do so. 173 This law also requires printed informational materials to be
distributed and used in all emergency rooms in the state. 174 In addition, there is a
specific requirement that the Washington State Department of Health respond to
complaints about the failure of hospitals to comply with the emergency contraception
mandate. 175 New York has now also adopted law requiring all hospitals to provide
emergency contraception to rape victims without any conscience clause protection.
176
It does, however, provide that emergency contraception need not be provided to rape
victims who are pregnant.
177
State laws mandating provision of emergency contraception without conscience
clause limitations may be problematic for Catholic hospitals. As discussed, infra, some
argue that it is not morally permissible for a Catholic hospital to provide emergency
contraception to a rape victim who is ovulating because of the potential abortifacient
effect of emergency contraceptive medications. But state laws mandating provision of
emergency contraception to all rape victims without any conscience clause limitations
would not permit denial of emergency contraceptive based on moral considerations.
Moreover, laws of this type that may require Catholic hospitals to disregard their local
bishop's interpretation of the ERD. Catholic teaching could establish a dangerous
precedent-if such laws come to be generally accepted, then the next step might be to
require Catholic hospitals to provide abortions. The assumption of policy makers may
be that Catholic hospitals are not all that serious about maintaining compliance with the
ERD if they go along with laws of this type without protest.
The adoption of these laws has been fostered by studies claiming that many
Catholic hospitals do not provide emergency contraception to rape victims, even within
169. Id.
170. United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, at 21.
171. H.R. 4113, 107th Cong. (2002).
172. 2002 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 382 (A.B. 1860) (West).
173. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.41.350 (1) (West 2004).
174. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.41.350 (2) (West 2004).
175. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.41.360 (West 2004).
176. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-P(2c) (McKinney 2004).
177. Id. at 2 1.
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the parameters set forth in Directive 36. In a small pilot study of the actual practices of
hospitals published in 2000, the authors telephoned the emergency departments of
seventy-eight large hospitals located in urban areas to ask a series of questions on the
availability of emergency contraception to rape victims. 178 The questions focused on
whether the hospitals permitted the discussing or dispensing of emergency
contraception, whether the hospital made referrals for emergency contraception, and the
number of rape cases treated. 179 Staff at nine of the hospitals refused to answer the
questions and staff at another eleven indicated they did not provide treatment for rape
victims. The final pool for the study consisted of fifty-eight hospitals, and twenty-
seven of the hospitals surveyed were Catholic hospitals.18 1 The study found that seven
of the Catholic hospitals had policies prohibiting physicians from prescribing
contraceptives, and five of these seven also prohibited physicians from discussing
contraceptives with patients. 182  Twelve of the Catholic hospitals had policies
prohibiting discussion of emergency contraception with rape victims. 183
Notwithstanding these policies, respondents at eight of the twelve hospitals indicated
"that relevant information would likely be provided to rape victims."' 184 Seventeen of
the Catholic hospitals prohibited the dispensing of emergency contraception in their
hospital pharmacies. 185  It was also noted that several Catholic hospitals had no
restrictions on the availability of emergency contraception, but the issue was considered
to be controversial even at these institutions.
186
As to the morality of providing emergency contraception in Catholic hospitals, the
study notes, "The proscription on the use of contraception does not apply in cases of
rape."' 187 It also notes that provision of emergency contraception may be impermissible
under Catholic teaching where it prevents implantation of an embryo in the
endometrium. 188  However, it states, "Testing a rape victim to determine whether
conception has occurred as a result of rape is not feasible, and the most that can be
accomplished is an extremely rough judgment of probabilities."' 189 Nonetheless, it
opines that under the principle of double effect, it is morally permissible for providers
in Catholic hospitals to provide rape victims with emergency contraception where their
intent is to prevent ovulation or conception even though they realize that the effect
could be abortifacient.
190
A 2002 study conducted by Ibis Reproductive Health for Catholics for a Free
Choice targeted the practices of Catholic hospitals with respect to Emergency
178. Steven S. Smugar, Informed Consent for Emergency Contraception: Variability in Hospital of Rape
Victims, 90 AM. J. PUB. H. 1372 (2000).
179. Id. at 1372.




184. Smugar, supra note 178, at 1373.




189. Smugar, supra note 178, at 1374.
190. Id.
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Contraception ("EC") and identified the ERD as "a potential obstacle to the provision of
EC in hospital emergency rooms. ' 19 1 Notwithstanding Directive 36, the Catholics for a
Free Choice study opines, "[I]n spite of ample medical evidence to the contrary, the
dominant view among the US bishops is that EC can work to cause an abortion and,
therefore, must be forbidden in all circumstances." 192 The Catholics for a Free Choice
study was conducted in late August 2002. Its surveyors called virtually all of the
Catholic hospital emergency rooms in the U.S. to question "the triage nurse or whoever
else answered the phone about the availability of emergency contraception in the
emergency room." 193 The study concludes:
Only five percent of the emergency rooms provided EC on request. An additional
23% of Catholic emergency rooms provide EC to rape victims only. Thus, only 28%
of Catholic ERs will provide women who have been raped with EC. Among those
hospitals that do provide EC to rape victims, the majority set up unnecessary barriers,
such as pregnancy tests or police reports. These hospitals also do not volunteer
information over the phone, but admit to dispensing EC to rape victims only after
repeated questioning, which could deter some victims. Some hospitals (6%)
indicated that the decision about providing EC was left to the attending physician.
Presumably, with good luck, a woman who had been raped might be seen by an
attending physician who would provide EC, but there were no guarantees. 194
The results of the Catholics for a Free Choice study have been widely reported, and
the study has been used to promote popular support for legislation mandating the
provision of emergency contraception and to place greater pressure on public agencies
to enforce existing legislation. For example, a 2003 article in the Spokesman-Review
focused on emergency contraception policies in hospitals operated by Providence
Services of Eastern Washington. 195 The article focused on that portion of the Catholics
for a Free Choice study claiming that six hospitals in Washington State, including
Sacred Heart Medical Center in Spokane, were in violation of a Washington State law
mandating provision of emergency contraception to sexual assault victims. 196  The
article reports that the study claims that triage nurses at some hospitals in the
Providence Services system, including Sacred Heart, told "mystery callers" posing as
rape victims that they do not provide emergency contraception. 197 A spokeswoman for
Sacred Heart, however, denied this and stated, "Sacred Heart has a written policy on
this issue which explicitly states that in cases of sexual assault, we provide emergency
contraception after tests indicate the patient is not currently pregnant."
198
191. SECOND CHANCE DENIED: EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION IN CATHOLIC HOSPITAL EMERGENCY
ROOMS, available at http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/PDF/EC%20Study.pdf.
192. Id. at 5.
193. Id. at 5.
194. Id.
195. Carla K. Johnson, Catholic Hospitals Violate State Law, Pro-Choice Group Claims, SPOKESMAN-






2. Sexual Assault Protocols Developed by Catholic Hospitals
State laws that require Catholic hospitals to provide emergency contraception to
rape victims may at times conflict with the ERD. There is a divergence of approaches
among bioethicists employed by Catholic hospitals over the application of Directive 36.
The primary basis for these divergent approaches is the uncertainty over whether
emergency contraceptive medications could have an abortifacient effect. Some
bioethicists are extremely skeptical as to whether emergency contraception treatments
can have an abortifacient effect. 199 Others, however, believe that the medication may
have an abortifacient effect.20 Directive 36 seems to recognize the possibility of an
abortifacient effect insofar as it prohibits any treatments that would interfere with
implantation of a fertilized ovum.201  Directive 36 permits the treatment with
emergency contraception medications "[i]f, after appropriate testing, there is no
evidence "that conception has occurred already." But since Directive 36 "does not spell
out precisely what constitutes 'appropriate testing' and 'evidence that conception has
occurred,"' variability exists in the interpretation of these phrases.
20 2
Two approaches to the issue have emerged: the ovulation approach and the
pregnancy approach. 203 The ovulation approach relies on testing to determine whether
the victim is ovulating in order to avoid providing emergency contraceptive medications
that could have an abortifacient effect. The pregnancy approach discounts the
possibility of an abortifacient effect and focuses on testing to determine whether the
victim has some preexisting pregnancy. 2° 4 If the victim is pregnant, then no emergency
contraception would be provided. Of course, in this case, no emergency contraception
would be needed since the pregnancy would not have resulted from the rape and the
medication would not interfere with an existing pregnancy.
2 °5
The arguments in favor of the pregnancy approach are based on the assumption that
emergency contraceptive medications do not have an abortifacient effect. 206  But
proponents of the pregnancy method may "have overstated the case against the
199. Telephone Interview with Jan Heller, Ph.D., Staff Ethicist for Providence Health System, and Sister
Karin Dufault, S.P., Ph.D., R.N, Chair of the Board, Providence Health System (Sept. 23, 2003).
200. Telephone Interview with Joseph J. Piccione, J.D., Mission Integration and Corporate Ethicist and
Attorney, OSF Healthcare, Peoria, Ill. (May 5, 2003).
201. Directive 36 provides:
Compassionate and understanding care should be given to a person who is the victim of sexual
assault. ... A female who has been raped should be able to defend herself against a potential
conception from the sexual assault. If, after appropriate testing, there is no evidence that
conception has occurred already, she may be treated with medications that would prevent
ovulation, sperm capacitation, or fertilization. It is not permissible, however, to initiate or
recommend treatments that have as their purpose or direct effect the removal, destruction, or
interference with a fertilized ovum.
United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, supra note 2 1, at 21.
202. Ronald P. Hamel & Michael R. Panicola, Emergency Contraception and Sexual Assault: Assessing
the Moral Approaches in Catholic Teaching, 83 HEALTH PROGRESS 12 (Sept.-Oct. 2002), available at
http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP0209&ARTICLE=I.
203. Id.
204. SECOND CHANCE DENIED, supra note 191, at 9.
205. Id.
206. Hamel & Panicola, supra note 202, at 13.
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abortifacient effects of high-dose estrogen-progestin pills."'207 There are several studies
indicating that emergency contraception methods "may impair endometrial receptivity
to the implantation of a fertilized egg.'"208 In a 2001 article reviewing the literature on
the mechanism of action for various emergency contraception medications, the authors
conclude there is "no clearcut answer to the question" of how emergency contraception
medications prevent pregnancy. 209 And more specifically, they state:
The most difficult parameter to assess with certainty is endometrial receptivity.
Endometrial markers of receptivity have been established so far with certainty only in
rodents. Even if endometrial receptivity is shown to be altered by EC, other steps that
precede implantation may also be altered enough to interrupt the process at an earlier
210
stage.
Although it is not clear at this time whether the changes to endometrial receptivity
are sufficient to inhibit implantation, 2 11 some physicians argue that since it potentially
prevents implantation, emergency contraception could act as an abortifacient. 212 Kevin
O'Rourke, a Catholic moral theologian who favors the ovulation approach, argues;
"Although impregnating a woman through rape would be a great injustice, it would not
be so great an injustice as killing an infant whom rape had brought into being."
' 2 13
Proponents of the ovulation approach point to the possibility of an abortifacient
effect as the basis for their concerns. Thus even if science has not at this time
authoritatively determined that emergency contraceptives have an abortifacient effect,
207. Daniel P. Sulmasy, A Reasonable, Realistic and Ethical Protocol, 83 HEALTH PROGRESS 15 (Sept.-
Oct. 2002) available at http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP0209&ARTICLE=K
(nonetheless, Sulmasy, a physician and a Catholic priest, endorses the pregnancy approach in light of the
delays in treatment that may result from use of the tests called for under the ovulatory approach).
208. David A. Grimes & Elizabeth G. Raymond, Emergency Contraception, 137 ANN. OF INT. MED. (3)
E-180, E-182 (Aug. 6, 2002).
209. Horacio B. Croxatto, et. al., Mechanism of Action of Hormonal Preparations Used for Emergency
Contraception: A Review of the Literature, 63 CONTRACEPTION 111 (2001).
210. Id. at 119.
211. Grimes & Raymond, supra note 208, at E-182.
212. Correspondence, Letter from Douglas P. Miller, M.D., Catawba Memorial Medical Center, Hickory,
N.C., 138 ANN. OF INT. MED. 237, available at
237http://www.annals.org/issues/v38n3/full/200302004000024.htm. The letter is a response to Grimes &
Raymond, Emergency Contraception, supra note 208, and states in part:
Hormonally mediated contraception, whether pre- or postcoital, is well recognized as having a dual
mechanism of action. Sometimes conception itself is prevented and sometimes implantation of an
already conceived embryo is prevented, thus precipitating an early abortion. The use of the term
abortion is appropriate for this type of procedure because a human embryo is genetically a distinct
individual from the moment of conception.
Id. The response by the authors is interesting in that it disagrees on the point of when a pregnancy begins but
does not take issue with the statement that the effect of emergency contraception may be to prevent
implantation. It states in part:
Dr. Miller apparently disagrees with the internationally accepted definition of the beginning of
pregnancy that we used in our review. Major medical organizations as well as the federal
government concur that implantation defines the beginning of pregnancy. Fertilization is a
necessary but insufficient step toward establishing pregnancy.
Correspondence, Letter from David A. Grimes, M.D. & Elizabeth G. Raymond, M.D., M.P.H., Family Health
International, Research Triangle Park, N.C., 138 ANN. OF INT. MED. 237-38, available at
http://www.annals.org/issues/vl38n3/full/200302004000024.html (footnotes omitted).
213. O'Rourke, supra note 168, at 67.
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neither has that possibility been authoritatively rejected. Accordingly, they use the
analogy of the hunter in the woods who sees movement behind a bush, but cannot
discern whether it is a deer or a human behind the bush. Under these circumstances, it
would not be morally permissible for the hunter to shoot whatever is behind the bush.
Proponents of the pregnancy approach reject this analogy arguing that it is inapposite.
While the hunter's intention is to kill what is behind the bush, the intention of the
provider administering emergency contraceptive medication is to prevent conception.214
Nonetheless, more typically the intention of the provider is to prevent pregnancy by any
means necessary including the prevention of implantation. Proponents of the pregnancy
approach also point to the lack of absolute proof of an abortifacient effect, but this
merely increases the level of uncertainty. Certainly, it would still be morally
impermissible for the hunter to shoot even if he was some distance from the target and a
poor shot.
The most prominent example of the ovulation approach is seen in the protocol
developed in 1995 by Joseph Piccione and Gerard McShane for use at St. Francis
Hospital in Peoria, Illinois, now known as the "Peoria Protocol." 2 15  Directive 36
requires the hospital to conduct tests to determine whether conception has already
occurred and permits administration of emergency contraception if the test is
negative. 2 16 But as noted by Father Kevin O'Rourke, the requirement of pregnancy
testing seems a bit peculiar since any detectable conception would have had to result
prior to the rape in light of the fact that such tests are not reliable until ten days after
conception has occurred. 2 17  In addition, according to O'Rourke, the second
requirement is also problematic since Ovral, an emergency contraceptive provided to
suppress ovulation, also acts as an abortifacient by preventing implantation.2 18 Thus
O'Rourke argues that the timing of ovulation is the critical determination in preventing
an abortion induced by taking Ovral.2 19 The Peoria Protocol uses a progesterone test
and a urine dip-stick test to ascertain the presence of leutinizing hormones (LH). 22 0 '
Rourke summarizes:
If the LH test is negative and supported by progesterone level findings, ovulation is
not occurring and Ovral may be used. If the LH test is positive, the process of
ovulation is under way and Ovral should not be used. The method seems to obviate
the quandary that occurs when a rape victim is unsure whether she has ovulated.
22 1
The Peoria Protocol specifically notes that it provides for "contraceptive
intervention" only where "there is a clinical indication that the effect of the intervention
214. Id.
215. Id. at 66.
216. United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, at 20; see also O'Rourke, Applying
the Directives, supra note 168, at 66.
217. O'Rourke, supra note 168, at 66.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Interim Protocol Sexual Assault: Contraceptive Treatment Component, OSF Health Care System,
Peoria, Illinois, Oct. 1995 (on file with author).
221. O'Rourke, supra note 168, at 66-67.
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will be truly contraceptive and not abortifacient."'222 The clinical determination that the
contraceptive intervention would not be abortifacient is based on the following: (1) the
menstrual history of the victim; (2) a blood test to determine hormone levels in order to
determine the timing of the ovulatory cycle; and (3) an OvuKit urine test to determine
whether ovulation has begun.223  By requiring both the urine dip-stick test and the
progesterone level test, the Peoria Protocol goes beyond other ovulation approach
protocols.
224
The Peoria Protocol has been approved by the Illinois State Department of Public
Health.225 Under Illinois law, hospitals that care for sexual assault victims are required
to develop a protocol to ensure that victims will receive information on emergency
contraception. 22 6 The protocol must be submitted to the state Department of Public
Health for approval.227  Under the Illinois law, the information provided to sexual
assault victims must include:
[M]edically and factually accurate and written and oral information about emergency
contraception; the indications and counter-indications and risks associated
with the use of emergency contraception; and a description of how and when
222. Interim Protocol Sexual Assault: Contraceptive Treatment Component, OSF Health Care System,
Peoria, Illinois, October, 1995 (on file with author).
223. Id.
224. Hamel & Panicola, supra note 202, at 13.
225. Telephone Interview with Joseph J. Piccione, J.D., Mission Integration and Corporate Ethicist, OSF
Health Care System, Peoria, Ill. (May 5, 2003).
226. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 70/2-2 (West 2004). The Department of Public Health has also adopted
regulations to implement this statute. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, § 545.95 (West 2004) provides:
(a) By April 30, 2002, every hospital providing services to alleged sexual assault survivors
in accordance with a plan approved under Section 545.35 of this Part must develop a
protocol for providing emergency contraception information and treatment to alleged
sexual assault survivors. (Section 2.2(b) of the Act)
(b) The Department shall request a plan that complies with the requirements of this Section
by April 1, 2002. The Department will approve the protocol if it finds that the
implementation of the protocol would provide sufficient protection for survivors of an
alleged sexual assault and if the protocol provides for the following as soon as possible
and, in any event, no later than 12 hours after the alleged sexual assault survivor
presents herself/himself at the hospital for emergency care:
1) medically and factually accurate written and oral information about
emergency contraception;
2) the indications and counter-indications and risks associated with the use of
emergency contraception;
3) a description of how and when victims may be provided emergency
contraception upon the written order of a physician (Section 2.2(b) of the
Act);
4) appropriate referral to a physician licensed to practice medicine in all its
branches as provided in the Medical Practice Act of 1987.
(c) The hospital shall implement the protocol upon approval by the Department. (Section
2.2(b) of the Act)
(d) The Department shall produce medically and factually accurate written materials that
all treatment hospitals shall provide to each female sexual assault survivor of
childbearing age.
227. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 70/2.2 (West 2004)
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victims may be provided emergency contraception upon the written order of a
physician licensed to practice medicine in all its branches.
228
The implementing regulations adopted by the Illinois Department of Public Health
also set forth sample protocols including one developed by the Catholic Hospital
Association.229  Under the Catholic Hospital Association protocol, a sexual assault
victim who tests negative for pregnancy on the blood test and also has a negative result
on the urine dip-stick test is to be offered Ovral. On the other hand, if she tests positive
on either of the tests, the emergency department will not provide Ovral. 23 Moreover, if
the woman is determined to be in her mid-cycle LH surge or in the early post-ovulatory
stage, Ovral or its equivalent will not be provided.
231
Another example of the ovulatory approach is the Guidelines for Catholic
Hospitals Treating Victims of Sexual Assault as approved by the Board of Governors of
the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference. 232 These guidelines provide that no anti-ovulant
drugs may be used if the pregnancy test is positive. 233 They emphasize that medical
interventions are permitted "as long as there is no anticipated effect of an
abortifacient." 234 Thus it is permissible to "use medications which prevent ovulation,
sperm capacitation, or fertilization.' '235 If the pregnancy test is negative, then clinical
determinations would be based on: "a menstrual history provided by the victim,"
"hormonal levels as determined by a blood test to categorize the timing of a woman's
ovulatory cycle," and "results of a urine test which is a reliable guide to the prediction
of ovulation." 236  The Pennsylvania guidelines go on to state, "If the urine test is
positive, this would indicate the hormonal shift to ovulation has begun. The use of a
contraceptive steroid intervention could be abortifacient and is therefore not permitted,
even though there might be no evidence that conception has occurred."
237
The ovulatory approach has been criticized as imposing unacceptable limitations on
the moral options available under Directive 36 insofar as the directive itself does not
explicitly prohibit the use of emergency contraceptive medications in women who have
recently ovulated or are about to ovulate. 238 This criticism, however, seems a bit
disingenuous because Directive 36 does prohibit use of treatments that have as "their
purpose or direct effect.., interference with the implantation of a fertilized ovum."
239
And in addition, Directive 45 clearly prohibits "[e]very procedure whose sole
immediate effect is the termination of pregnancy before viability ... which... includes
228. Id.
229. See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 77, §545. APP. C Emergency Contraception Protocols (West 2004).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Bd. of Governors of the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, Guidelines for Catholic Hospitals
Treating Victims of Sexual Assault, Sept. 23, 1998, available at






238. Hamel & Panicola, supra note 202, at 12-13.
239. United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, at 21.
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the interval between conception and implantation of the embryo."
240
Perhaps more persuasively, critics of the ovulatory approach also point out that
conception only occurs when fertilization is complete, and fertilization is a process that
occurs over a twenty-four hour period.24 1 Accordingly, they argue that it is morally
permissible to administer emergency contraception to any sexual assault victim who
comes to the emergency treatment within that twenty-four hour period.242 They bolster
their argument by noting that it is very unlikely that a conception will occur as a result
of rape. 243 They further argue that the weight of medical evidence at this time does not
support the notion that emergency contraception medications act as an abortifacient by
preventing implantation.244 And they criticize the Peoria Protocol as seeking absolute
certainty, again emphasizing "the extremely small" risk of destruction of a
conceptus. 245  Finally, they argue that proponents of the ovulation approach have
distorted the moral object of administering the emergency contraception medication to a
woman who is ovulating in light of the small risk of preventing implantation.
246
In contrast to the ovulation approach, the pregnancy approach tests only for an
existing pregnancy. If the test result is negative, then the victim would be offered
emergency contraception. 247 Of course, as noted by O'Rourke, the problem with this
approach is that a pregnancy resulting from the rape would not show up for at least ten
days following the incident. 248 Nonetheless, proponents of the pregnancy approach
argue that it is morally preferable for several reasons. They argue that no tests can
provide evidence of conception from recent sexual assault and prior pregnancy is ruled
out so as to protect a developing embryo.2 4 9 And further that the ruling out of a prior
pregnancy provides sufficient moral certainty in light of the relatively unlikely chance
of a conception occurring because of rape and the lack of scientific studies establishing
an abortifacient effect for emergency contraceptive medications. In this regard, they
characterize the moral object of the administration of the medication as the prevention
of conception rather than the prevention of implantation. They also refer to a
proportionate justification for the act, i.e., "the prevention of pregnancy resulting from
the sexual assault and its subsequent impact on the overall well-being of the woman.
' 2 50
Finally, they argue that the Catholic moral tradition does not always require taking the
safest approach. In this regard, they point to the principle of double effect as applied in
the cases of administering morphine to patients in severe pain even if that may hasten
death, and the allowance for the bombing of military targets in wartime even if there is
some risk of collateral damage to civilian targets.
25 1
240. Id. at 26.
241. Hamel & Panicola, supra note 202, at 15.
242. Id. at 15-16.
243. Id. at 16.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 17.
246. Id.
247. Hamel & Panicola, supra note 203, at 17.
248. O'Rourke, supra note 168, at 66.
249. Hamel & Panicola, supra note 202, at 17.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 18.
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III. THE MORAL FOUNDATION OF CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE : THE CATHOLIC NATURAL
LAW TRADITION, THE ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES, AND CATHOLIC IDENTITY
The trend toward the adoption of legislation requiring Catholic hospitals to provide
reproductive services that may violate Catholic teaching has undoubtedly been fostered
by the perception among policymakers that the leaders of these institutions may not be
serious about preserving their distinctive mission insofar as it requires them to refrain
from providing or cooperating in the provision of access to reproductive services. This
perception is perhaps not surprising in light of continuing assaults on the Catholic
natural law tradition by revisionist theologians. Changes in the cultural and religious
environment have had a significant impact on Catholic health care as traditional
Catholic teachings on human sexuality and reproduction have become increasingly
counter-cultural. Notwithstanding these changes, the teaching of the Church as derived
from the Catholic natural law tradition and expressed in Papal documents and the ERD
have remained remarkably constant in their rejection of artificial contraception, direct
sterilization, and direct abortion.
Since the Second Vatican Council, there has been substantial controversy among
Catholic theologians over the morality of contraception, sterilization, and even abortion
under certain circumstances. Through the 1950s, many priests relied on manuals on
medical moral issues written by such authors as Gerald Kelly, Charles J. McFadden,
and Thomas J. O'Donnell, all scholars working in the Catholic natural law tradition.
252
In the 1960s, however, a fundamental split arose between Catholic moral theologians
who relied on traditional natural law methodology, and those who advocated a more
contextual, practical approach and eschewed reliance on transcendent, pre-existing
absolute norms. Revisionist theologians working in the latter school, typically referred
to as proportionalists or consequentialists, sought an accommodation between Church
teaching and the secular culture. The secular movement of bioethics also has had an
impact on Catholic health care. Notwithstanding their widespread influence, the Vatican
repudiated the approach taken by the revisionists and secular bioethicists.
A. The Catholic Natural Law Tradition
The Church traditionally adopted a natural law framework for addressing medico-
moral issues. In the Catholic natural law tradition, certain actions are deemed
intrinsically immoral notwithstanding potentially beneficial consequences. 253 William
May, drawing on the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, summarizes the traditional
approach by noting that there are three levels of natural law precepts: 1) self-evident
first principles (e.g., good is to be pursued and evil avoided); 2) a second set of more
specific precepts that can be readily derived from first principles through the use of
natural reason; and 3) more "remote conclusions," i.e., specific moral norms, known
252. George P. Graham, Bioethics: An Orphan Discipline, HOMILETIC & PASTORAL REv. 10, May 2001,
at 10, available at
http://www.catholicculture.org/usertools/print.cfm?id=4126&itemtype=Library%20Document (last visited
Sept. 15, 2004).
253. WILLIAM E. MAY, AN INTRODUCTION TO MORAL THEOLOGY 282 (2d ed. 2003).
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only to the "wise, or those perfected in the virtue of prudence."' 254 Traditional Catholic
theologians, such as Professor May, argue that the Magisterium of the Church has
infallibly taught certain core moral precepts such as those summarized in the
Decalogue, "precisely as these precepts have been traditionally understood within the
Church."255 This would include the traditional proscription of abortion.256 In addition,
there are specific moral norms, e.g., the proscription on artificial contraception, that
have been authoritatively proposed by the Magisterium but may not be infallibly
proclaimed.257  Traditionalists, such as May, argue that dissent among Catholic
theologians is not permissible even as to these latter, more specific norms.
258
Albert Jonsen notes that the approach taken by Catholic moral theologians through
the middle of the twentieth century was typified by "an exposition of fundamental
moral principles derived from natural law and divine revelations, followed by a
casuistic analysis of specific topics."'259 It was also characterized by deference to theMa " " " 260
Magisterium. This approach may be seen in Medical Ethics, a work by Charles J.
McFadden that was originally designed for teaching Catholic nurses but later modified
for use in teaching ethics to pre-medical students, nurses, medical students, and
physicians.26 1 In the introduction to McFadden's work, Fulton J. Sheen emphasizes the
importance of doctors and nurses having "a moral sense of oughtness."
262
McFadden's discussion of ethics is based on natural law. Indeed, he clearly
explicates his belief in "absolute" moral norms that are "immutable" and "universal,"
i.e., binding at all times and in all places on all people.263 Natural law, in the Thomistic
tradition, is humanity's participation in the eternal law through the use of reason.264 He
also emphasizes the importance of "true conscience," a conscience that is properly
formed and directs actions in accordance with the precepts of the natural law. 265 Noting
the difficulty in ascertaining the precepts of the natural law, McFadden also refers to
"[tihe Moral Law" that "is to be found in tradition, in Sacred Scripture, and in the
teaching of Christ's infallible Church." 266 He concludes, "[i]t is this law known both by
reason and Divine Revelation which should be cherished by doctor and nurse alike as
the source and basis of their moral ideals."
' 267
The principle of double effect also plays a significant role in the traditional
254. Id. at 77-78.
255. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
256. Id. at 252.
257. There is an ongoing debate over whether the teaching of Humanae Vitae is infallible. Most consider
it to be authoritative, but not infallible. Others have argued that the document itself was infallibly proclaimed
ex cathedra by Pope Paul VI, or that even if it wasn't proclaimed ex cathedra, the teaching is infallible
because it has been continuously proclaimed by the universal ordinary Magisterium. JANET E. SMITH,
HUMANAE VITAE: A GENERATION LATER 155- 60 (1991).
258. Id. at 215-23.
259. ALBERT R. JONSEN, THE BIRTH Or BIOETHICS 36 (1998).
260. Id.
261. McFADDEN, supra note 37, at xiii (3d ed. 1953).
262. Id. at xii.
263. Id. at 18.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 20- 2 1.
266. Id. at 18.
267. McFADDEN, supra note 37, at 18.
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Catholic natural law approach. The principle of double effect treats as morally licit
indirect abortions or sterilizations, i.e., abortions or sterilizations that result as
unintentional byproducts of medical treatments for serious pathological conditions.
Gerald Kelly notes that under the principle of double effect, an action is deemed
morally licit if the following requirements are met:
1) The action, considered by itself and independently of its effect, must not be
morally evil . . . 2) The evil effect must not be the means of producing the good
effect. The principle underlying this condition is that good end cannot justify the use
of an evil means... 3) The evil effect is sincerely not intended, but merely tolerated.
• . 4) There must be a proportionate reason for performing the action, in spite of its
evil consequences. In practice, this means that there must be a sort of balance
between the total good and the total evil produced by an action. Or, to put it another
way, it means that, according to a sound prudential estimate, the good to be obtained
is of sufficient value to compensate for the evil that must be tolerated.
268
As to contraception, McFadden notes that by the 1940s, the use of contraception
was already widespread even among Catholics.269 Nonetheless, he states that "[i]n
contraception, man completely perverts the order of nature and acts contrary to the will
of the Creator." 270 He concludes with the following instruction to Catholic nurses and
doctors: "No instruction on the methods of using contraceptives of any type may be
given to any person, regardless of religion, by a doctor or nurse."27 1 Not surprisingly,
McFadden also condemns all direct sterilizations, i.e. surgical sterilizations of a man or
woman for the purpose of preventing future pregnancies, as "mutilation[s]" that are not
morally licit. 272 On the other hand, in accordance with the principle of double effect, he
recognizes that "therapeutic sterilizations," i.e. procedures resulting in sterility where
"the primary objective is the removal of a diseased organ and the preservation of the
health and life of the patient" rather than where the "[d]esire to effect sterilization" is
the motive, may be morally licit.
273
As to abortion, in conformity with Catholic tradition, McFadden condemns all
"direct abortions," defined as procedures "employed to procure the expulsion of
fetus."274 This condemnation would include "therapeutic abortion" defined as abortions
that are "directly induced as a means of safeguarding the health and life of the
mother. ' 275  On the other hand, in accordance with the principle of double effect,
"indirect abortion[s]," defined as "any instance in which a treatment or operative
procedure is performed for some other purpose but incidentally and secondarily does
cause the expulsion of the fetus," are deemed morally licit.
276
268. GERALD KELLY, MEDICO-MORAL PROBLEMS 13-14 (1958); see also MCFADDEN, MEDICAL ETHics,
supra note 37, at 33.
269. MCFADDEN, supra note 37, at 77-80.
270. Id. at 93.
271. Id. at 99.
272. Id. at 282.
273. Id. at 294-95.
274. Id. at 162.
275. MCFADDEN, supra note 37, at 162.
276. Id.
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B. The Challenge of.Revisionist Theologians
Revisionist Catholic theologians (sometimes referred to as proportionalists or
consequentialists) generally reject the notion that the violation of specific norms such as
the prohibition on direct abortions, direct sterilizations or artificial contraception may be
considered intrinsically immoral acts notwithstanding their consequences and
context. 277 Many revisionists acknowledge that there are some absolute principles, i.e.,
the obligation to always "act in conformity with love of God and neighbor."278 They
would also generally acknowledge that norms using "morally evaluative language" may
be absolute, e.g. a prohibition on murder rather than a prohibition on direct killing.
279
Professor May, who coined the term proportionalism to describe the approach taken by
revisionist theologians, summarizes the major principles underlying their arguments as
follows: "(1) the requirements of the 'preference principle' or 'principle of
proportionate good;' (2) the existence of a human act as a totality; and (3) the historicity
of human existence."
280
As to the "principle of proportionate good," revisionist theologians argue that in
articulating norms it is necessary to take into account the effect of the norms on "human
goods or values."'28 1  Under this approach, acts such as direct abortion, direct
sterilization and contraception could be considered moral if "done for the sake of a
proportionally greater good."282  The totality argument is closely related to the
proportionality argument and proposes that the morality of an act can only be appraised
by taking account of the totality of its effect.283 This also requires an appraisal of the
actor's intention.284 Thus under this view, contraceptive sterilization when undertaken
because a future pregnancy could endanger a mother's life could be viewed as
appropriate for the purpose of stabilizing the marriage. 285  Finally, the historicity
argument is that specific moral norms develop in particular historical contexts and are
subject to revision based on continuing human experience.
286
The controversy between Catholic traditionalists and revisionists parallels the
divide in moral theology between deontologists and teleologists. In appraising the
morality of particular acts, deontologists, focusing on pre-existing transcendent norms,
accept the notion that certain acts are intrinsically evil notwithstanding their seemingly
beneficial consequences. Teleologists, on the other hand, focus on whether a
277. See, e.g., CHARLES E. CURRAN, MEDICINE AND MORALS 29 (1970), stating:
Since the experience of Christian people and all men of good will is a source of moral knowledge,
an ethician cannot simply spell out in advance everything that must be done by the doctor. And
generally speaking, in other complicated areas of human life, the theologian cannot say that this or
that action must always be performed. In many matters of medicine the ethician can merely tell
the doctor to exercise his own prudent moral judgment. The patient and the doctor together must
decide the feasibility of performing an operation by weighing the advantages against the risk.
278. MAY, supra note 253, at 104.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 105.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 106.
283. Id. at 107.
284. MAY, supra note 253, at 108.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 109.
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proportionate good is brought about by the act in question.287 The traditional Catholic
natural law position is conventionally viewed as deontological, although some
revisionist theologians argue that it is for the most part teleological. 28 8 Indeed, it is
argued by revisionist theologians that with the exception of norms such as the
prohibition of artificial contraception and direct killing, most norms in the Catholic
tradition have been "teleologically parsed."'289 Nonetheless, while some revisionists
argue that their position is neither strictly deontological or teleological, the primary
focus of their activity has been the rejection of the deontological approach taken by the
traditionalists.
290
Revisionists also contend that it is permissible for Catholic theologians to publicly
dissent from non-infallible teachings proposing specific moral norms, such as the
proscription of artificial contraception. 29 1 Following the Second Vatican Council this
controversy over the nature of moral reasoning within the Catholic tradition became
public as seen in the reaction to Humanae Vitae,292 the Papal encyclical rejecting
artificial contraception. William May argues that the "roots of the rejection of moral
absolutes" by revisionist theologians may be found in the Majority Report on the issue
of contraception issued by the Papal Commission for the Study of Population, the
Family and Natality. 293 Clearly, although revisionist theologians may be a disparate
group, virtually all of them reject the Catholic Church's ban on artificial contraception
and it is difficult to understand the movement apart from the controversy over this
issue.294  Eventually, those who dissented from Humanae Vitae realized that the
traditional natural law approach did not provide a satisfactory basis for their dissent and
began to develop alternative approaches. 295 Instead, building on the principle of double
effect, they developed a new approach to medical ethical issues that resisted the
application of absolute moral norms.296
For example, in a 1970 book, Charles Curran, a leading revisionist theologian,
outlines the "Points of Dissatisfaction" with the Catholic natural law tradition.297 His
basic position is that the Catholic natural law tradition is untenable because it is based
on the existence of pre-existing, absolute medico-moral norms. 298 Curran begins by
noting that the Catholic natural law tradition had been a major point of disagreement
between Protestant and Catholic theologians and calls for a "critical appraisal of natural
law theory" noting that the questioning of the Church's position on contraception had
led to a questioning of the entire system of natural law on which it was based.2 99 He
287. CHRISTOPHER KACZOR, PROPORTIONALISM AND THE NATURAL LAW TRADITION 10-11 (2002).
288. Id. at 13-14.
289. Id. at 14-15.
290. Id. at 12.
291. MAY, supra note 253, at 215.
292. POPE PAUL VI, HUMANAE VITAE (1968), available at
http://www.ewtn.com/library/ENCYC/P6HUMANA.HTM.
293. MAY, supra note 253, at 101.
294. KACZOR, supra note 287, at 4-5.
295. CURRAN, supra note 277, at 29.
296. JONSEN, supra note 259, at 54 (discussing the work of Richard McCormick).
297. CURRAN, supra note 277, at 2-8.
298. Id. at 43.
299. Id. at 1.
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notes that while Catholic natural law theory has received wide support "from many men
of goodwill" in the area of social justice, in the area of medical morals it had not been
well received. 30 According to Curran, the primary defect in regard to the Catholic
natural law tradition's approach to issues such as abortion, contraception, sterilization,
and artificial insemination is its unfortunate focus on "the physical structure of the act
itself."30 1 He argues that it is preferable to view an act in its "total human context"
rather than just focusing on its physical attributes.
30 2
Curran also criticizes traditional law theory as embracing an archaic "classicist
world view" that focused on the immutable instead of an "historical worldview" that
focuses on change and evolution.303 These two worldviews in turn create two different
theological methodologies: the classicist focuses on preexisting abstract principles
while the historicist focuses on the context of the act.3°4 Although he acknowledges
that Vatican II does not officially adopt either view, he sees the primary thrust of
Vatican II to be tilted toward the historicist view noting its emphasis on the importance
of entering into dialogue with the modem world.305  On the statements of the
Magisterium of the Church, he notes that, unfortunately, many Catholics still accept
them "in a somewhat fundamentalist manner." 30 6 Instead, he suggests that they should
be viewed "in light of the historical, cultural, and scientific circumstances of the time in
which they were composed."
30 7
Curran treats contraception and sterilization as related questions noting that once
one accepts the notion that reproduction may be prevented that, other than the
permanence of the procedure, there was little basis for distinguishing between
"interfering with the act of sexual intercourse (contraception) or interfering with the
reproductive faculty (anovulant pills, sterilizing operations). '"308 He thus concludes that
a rejection of the natural law basis on the use of contraception by married couples, as
advocated by the majority of the Papal commission, also necessitates a rejection of any
limitation on direct sterilization.309  Curran also questions the traditional absolute
prohibition on direct abortions. 31  He suggests that the traditional teaching should be
modified to permit an abortion where it is necessary to save the life of the mother.
311
Curran also criticizes the use of the principle of double effect in traditional Catholic
natural law teaching noting that it has been typically used to distinguish between
situations where the evil effect is merely permitted for proportionate reasons (deemed
morally licit) rather than intended (deemed morally illicit).3 12 Curran is critical of the
traditional use of the principle of double effect insofar as it has focused on the "sole
300. Id. at 2.
301. Id. at 16.
302. CURRAN, supra note 277, at 17.
303. Id. at 19-20.
304. Id. at 20-21.
305. Id. at 22-24.
306. Id. at 31.
307. CURRAN, supra note 277, at 31-32.
308. Id.
309. Id. at 3.
310. Id. at 5.
311. Id. at 7.
312. CURRAN, supra note 277, at 7.
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immediate effect" of the procedure in question without reference to other values.
3 13
Thus although it would permit termination of an ectopic pregnancy by removal of the
fallopian tube where the purpose of the procedure is to prevent the rupture of the tube, it
would not permit removal of the fetus alone.3 14 Curran would extend this principle so
as to permit removal of the fetus without removal of the tube in order to preserve the
woman's fertility.
3 15
Clearly the influence of the revisionists has been significant: in 1977, the Catholic
Theological Society of America published a study stating that artificial contraception,
sterilization and masturbation could not be considered intrinsically immoral acts.
3 16
The issuance of Humanae Vitae marked the beginning of an era of public dissent where
large numbers of people remained in the Church despite their rejection of its teaching
on matters related to human sexuality. 317  There were also well known Catholic
theologians who argued that Catholic hospitals operating in a pluralistic society should
provide procedures such as contraceptive sterilizations that are considered morally
permissible by large segments of the population. 3 18 These same theologians argued that
an obligation to provide sterilizations and contraception also flowed from the receipt of
public funds.
319
The ongoing abortion controversy has placed additional pressure on Catholic
hospitals. Abortion was legalized throughout the United States by judicial fiat in
1973. 320 In 1973, the pro-choice group Catholics for a Free Choice was founded "as an
offshoot of the National Organization for Women." 321 In addition, many high-profile
313. Id.
314. Id. at 6.
315. Id. The 1971 ERD appear to require removal of the tube itself rather than permitting removal of the
fetus alone. Directive 16, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities, reprinted in THOMAS
J. O'DONNELL, S.J., MEDICINE AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY 311, 315 (1976).
316. Cf PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEW ANTI-CATHOLICISM: THE LAST ACCEPTABLE PREJUDICE 59-60
(2003):
The dispute over Humanae Vitae also dissolved traditional constraints about openly challenging
Church authorities. Very shortly after the encyclical was issued, prominent Catholic theologian
Charles Curran announced to a press conference that Catholics were not bound to obey the papal
pronouncement, and his doubts were publicly echoed by hundreds of other priests and Catholic
educators. This was an early manifestation of what would be a continuing theme over the next
thirty years: the repeated clashes between Church authorities and liberal theologians, especially on
the issues of sexuality. In 1977, the once dependably orthodox Catholic Theological Society of
America (CTSA) published the study Human Sexuality, which stated that no definitive grounds
existed to condemn practices such as contraception, sterilization, and masturbation.
317. Id. at 59. According to Professor Jenkins:
[F]rom the late 1960s, the contraception debate made the issue of obedience crucially important.
For most Catholic families, to accept the official Church position meant pursuing a course that
would profoundly affect one's everyday life and prosperity. Many families chose to disregard
Church teaching on this vital issue, though without feeling the need to abandon the Church. By
1992, a Gallup poll found that 80 percent of U.S. Catholics disagreed with the statement 'Using
artificial means of birth control is wrong.'
Id. at 58-59. (footnotes omitted).
318. CHRISTOPHER J. KAUFFMAN, MINISTRY AND MEANING: A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF CATHOLIC
HEALTH CARE IN THE UNITED STATES 290-91 (1995).
319. Id. at 291 (quoting from Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Not What Catholic Hospitals Ordered, 39
LINACRE Q. 21 (May 1972)).
320. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
321. JENKINS, supra note 316, at 60.
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Catholic politicians are avowedly pro-choice. 322 And Professor Charles Curran, a well-
known Catholic moral theologian, priest, and one time faculty member at Catholic
University, even suggested that direct abortion could be considered a moral option to be
provided by Catholic hospitals under some circumstances.
323
C. The Challenge of the Secular Discipline of Bioethics
Beginning in the 1960s, the secular discipline of bioethics began to emerge and to
some extent supplant the traditional Catholic natural law approach to medico-moral
issues even in Catholic institutions. Albert Jonsen, a pioneer in the bioethics
movement, a laicized Jesuit priest and former theology professor at the University of
San Francisco, traces the beginning of bioethics as a discrete discipline to the
development of a shunt by Belding Scribner at the University of Washington that
permitted persons with kidney failure to receive long-term dialysis.324 In the case of the
development of dialysis, the Seattle Artificial Kidney Center had more patients than it
could possibly treat, and a committee was formed to determine, out of those determined
to be medically suitable, "who shall live and who shall die." 325 The committee made its
determination through the use of "social worth criteria. ' 326 The activities of the Seattle
committee occasioned significant controversy and discussion among prominent ethicists
and theologians.327 Eventually, the new secular discipline of bioethics was organized
through several conferences in the 1960s and the emergence of centers such as the
Kennedy Institute at Georgetown, the Hastings Center and the Society of Health and
Human Values.
328
Later the Belmont Report, a government-commissioned study that focused on
human subjects research, identified three governing principles of secular bioethics:
"respect for persons, beneficence and justice." 329 Ultimately, these "principles found
322. William Lobdell & Teresa Watanabe, Church May Penalize Politicians; Bishops Are Exploring
Requiring Officeholders Who Are Catholic to Back Official Doctrine, L.A. TIMES, November 29, 2003, 2003
WL 68901157. The prominent pro-choice Catholic politicians mentioned in this article are Senator Edward
Kennedy (D-Mass.), Governor George Pataki (R,-New York), Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger (R. Cal.),
and Rep. Nancy Pelosi (D-Cal.). Id. The article also refers to statistics from the American Life League, a
pro-life group, indicating that voters have elected 412 politicians to state and federal offices who are both
Catholic and pro-choice. Id.
323. CURRAN, supra note 277, at 29. He states:
Perhaps in other matters now spelled out in the hospital code, more room should be left for
conscientious decision by the doctor. The problem seems to reside in a system of theory that
attaches exclusive moral importance to the physical structure of an act. At the very least,
theologians must listen when doctors of good will are listening to them. In fact, theologians must
ask doctors to reveal their moral experience. The doctor must at least be listened to with respect
when he honestly says that he thinks a raped 15-year-old girl who is a patient in a mental hospital
should be aborted.
324. Id. JONSEN, supra note 259, at x-xI.
325. Id. at 212.
326. Id.; see also Graham, Bioethics: An Orphan Discipline, supra note 252, at 11-12.
327. JONSEN, supra note 259, at 214-15.
328. Id. at 13-26.
329. Id. at 103 (discussing THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, THE BELMONT REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979)); see also Dianne N. Irving, The Impact of
International Bioethics on the 'Sanctity of Life Ethics', and the Ability of OB Gyn 's to Practice According to
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their way into the general literature of the field, and, in the process, grew from the
principles underlying the conduct of research into the basic principles of bioethics."
330
Accordingly, ethical decisions in particular situations are to be arrived at by balancing
these competing ethical principles; no one principle trumps the others. 33 1 Thus the
philosophical underpinnings of the secular discipline of bioethics are essentially
pragmatic and teleological. Indeed, some argue that bioethics is morally and
philosophically incoherent.
332
The discipline of secular bioethics has influenced Catholic hospitals and
particularly their ethics committees, as well as the professional bioethicists employed by
them. 333  In the wake of Humanae Vitae, a number of Catholic moral theologians,
including Jonsen, decided that they could no longer defend the Church's traditional
positions on abortion and contraception. 334 According to Jonsen, the debate within the
Catholic Church on the morality of contraception "inadvertently promoted the growth
of bioethics by increasing the ranks of the new bioethicists." 335 Moreover, "it drove
others away from their original home in Catholic moral theology into the new field of
bioethics. ' 336  And questions as to the morality of abortion, sterilization and
contraception eventually disappeared altogether from the agenda of the new
bioethicists.
337
Not surprisingly, therefore, within the world of Catholic health care compliance
with the ERD has been, at times, problematic. One observer has noted, "[t]he provision
of abortion and other reproductive-altering services prohibited by the religious
directives would violate its moral commitments and thus would not be offered by
Catholic hospitals. ' 338 But, nonetheless, a few Catholic hospitals have been accused of
attempting to circumvent the ERD by cooperating with non-Catholic health care
providers to offer sterilization services.339 In some instances Catholic hospitals have
provided surgical sterilization procedures through unrelated organizations or at a
separately operated clinic within the hospital itself.340 Typically, obstetrician-
gynecologists who practice in Catholic hospitals and in physician office buildings
owned by Catholic hospitals provide prescriptions for contraceptives to their patients.
341
Conscience (paper presented at International Conference: The Future of Obstetrics and Gynaecology,
International Federation of Catholic Medical Associations and MaterCare International, Rome, Italy, June 18,
2001), available at http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_40bioandconscience0l .html.
330. JONSEN, supra note 259, at 104 (footnote omitted).
331. Irving, supra note 329.
332. Id.
333. Irving, supra note 329.
334. JONSEN, supra note 260, at 300.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. at 296, 303.
338. White, supra note 21, at 220-21.
339. See Christopher Zehnder, What's Ailing Catholic Hospitals, CRIsIs, Nov. 2001, available at
http://www.crisismagazine.com/november2001/feature8.htm.
340. At least one Catholic Hospital announced that it would perform medically-indicated sterilizations in
the hospital rather than in a related facility. The hospital is St. Louise Regional Hospital, a facility operated
by Catholic Healthcare West in Gilroy, California. Ron Shrinkman, Survival v. Directives, MODERN
HEALTHCARE, Nov. 20, 2000, at 12.
341. The results of a 1975 survey conducted by anonymous mail questionnaires on the sterilization and
contraceptive practices in United States Catholic hospitals revealed that even at that time 20% of the 348
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And abortion referrals have been provided in community health care facilities that have
been merged with Catholic hospitals. 342
D. The Vatican's Rejection of the Revisionist Attack on Absolute Moral Norms
As noted previously, revisionist theologians reject the notion that there are absolute
moral norms, i.e., norms that are always true, that authoritatively determine such
matters as the immorality of artificial contraception, direct sterilization and direct
abortion. Revisionists contend that these sort of "specific moral absolutes defended in
the Catholic tradition and affirmed by the Magisterium isolate partial aspects of human
acts and, on the basis of such isolated aspects, render decisive moral judgments about
them." 343 Instead, revisionists propose that the morality of such acts should be judged
based on the totality of the circumstances and in light of the potential for further "self-
development" of the moral actor.
344
Revisionist theologians also embrace a principle of "proportionate good" whereby
"some acts of direct abortion... [and] contraception... can be morally right acts if...
done for the sake of a proportionately greater good." 345 From this viewpoint, acts such
as direct sterilization to preserve the health of the mother against the threat of future
pregnancies and the use of artificial contraception could be justified as enhancing or
preserving family stability.346 Finally, revisionist theologians argue that moral norms
are the product of human experience and particular historical circumstance and as such
must be subject to revision as civilization advances.
34 7
Notwithstanding the widespread influence of the revisionists, the Catechism of the
Catholic Church348 and two papal encyclicals issued in the 1990s reject the arguments
put forth by revisionist theologians and reaffirm traditional Catholic teaching on the
existence of absolute moral norms. In Veritatis Splendor (1993) 349 and Evangelium
facilities responding to the survey permitted medically-indicated sterilizations. Of the fifty-three residency
hospitals responding, seventeen provided oral contraceptives, thirteen provided diaphragms, five provided
IUDs and six provided all methods of contraceptives. Of the 283 non-residency hospitals responding, forty-
one provided oral contraceptives, twenty-two provided diaphragms, seventeen provided IUDs, and thirty-eight
provided all methods of contraceptives. John M. O'Lane, Sterilization and Contraception Services in
Catholic Hospitals, 133 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 355, 356 (1979).
342. The Daughters of Charity, with the approval of the local bishop, agreed to continue to provide
abortion referrals, at least on a temporary basis, at Niagara Falls Memorial Hospital, a community hospital
that was merged with St. Mary's, a hospital owned by the Daughters. Lucette Lugnado, Religious Practice:
Their Role Growing, Catholic Hospitals Juggle Doctrine and Medicine, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1999 at Al,
available at 1999 WL-WSJ 5439555. In addition, Brackenridge Hospital, a city-owned hospital that is
managed by Ascension Health, provided abortion referrals in a city-operated clinic set aside within the
hospital to provide contraceptives and sterilizations. Kim Sue Lia Perkes, Bishops to Weigh Tighter Controls
at Catholic Hospitals, AUSTtN-AM. STATESMAN, October 26, 2000, available at
http://www.cath4choice.org/new/inthenews/102600BishopsWeighControls.htm.
343. MAY, supra note 253, at 103.
344. Id.
345. Id. at 106.
346. Id. at 108.
347. Id. at 109.
348. CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (English trans., 1994) [hereinafter CATECHISM].
349. POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR (1993), available at
http://www.vatican.va/holy-father/j ohn-paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hf jp-iienc06081993_veritatis-
splendor-en.html [hereinafter VERITATIS SPLENDOR].
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Vitae (1995), 35  Pope John Paul II condemns the approach taken by revisionist
theologians and reasserts the Catholic natural law tradition. These developments have
in turn had an influence on the 1994 and 2001 versions of the ERD, discussed infra.
The Catechism embraces the traditional Catholic natural law approach stating:
"There are concrete acts that it is always wrong to choose, because their choice entails a
disorder of the will, i.e., a moral evil. One may not do evil so that good may result from
it."35 ' The Catechism also reasserts traditional Church teaching on abortion,
sterilization, and contraception. Paragraph 22 states that "[h]uman life must be
respected and protected absolutely from the moment of conception." 352 Paragraph 2271
further states: "Since the first century the Church has affirmed the moral evil of every
procured abortion. This teaching has not changed and remains unchangeable. Direct
abortion, that is to say, abortion willed either as an end or a means, is gravely contrary
to the moral law." 353 Under Paragraph 2272 of the Catechism, the penalty for formal
cooperation in the procurement of an abortion is automatic excommunication.
354
Paragraph 2366 condemns both artificial contraception and contraceptive sterilization
by providing that "it is necessary that each and every marriage act remain ordered per
se to the procreation of life." 355 It further notes: "This particular doctrine, expounded
on numerous occasions by the Magisterium, is based on the inseparable connection,
established b God, which man on his own initiative may not break, between the unitive
significance and the procreative significance which are both inherent to the marriage
act."
, 356
Veritatis Splendor was issued for the purpose of responding to the claims of
revisionists and "with the intention of clearly setting forth certain aspects of doctrine
which are of crucial importance in facing what is certainly a genuine crisis." 357 The
encyclical was occasioned by the need to restate "certain fundamental truths of Catholic
doctrine which in the present circumstances, risk being distorted or denied."
358
Specifically, it was occasioned by the phenomenon of public dissent within the Church
that rejected the "Church's moral teachings" and the authoritative role of the
Magisterium.
359
Veritatis Splendor affirms the authority of the Magisterium to establish absolute
norms governing moral conduct. 36  Part II of the encyclical directly confronts the
350. POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE (1995) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE].
351. CATECHISM, supra note 348, at para. 1761.
352. Id. at para. 2270.
353. Id. at para. 2271.
354. Id. at para. 2366.
355. Id. (quoting HUMANAE VITAE, supra note 76).
356. CATECHISM, supra note 348 (quoting HUMANAE VITAE, supra note 76).
357. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 349, at para. 5 (emphasis in original).
358. Id. at para. 4.
359. Id.
360. Id. at para. 25, stating:
The moral prescriptions which God imparted in the Old Covenant, and which attained their
perfection in the New and Eternal Covenant in the very person of the Son of God made man, must
be faithfully and continually put into practice in the various different cultures throughout the
course of history. The task of interpreting these prescriptions was entrusted by Jesus to the
Apostles and their successors, with the special assistance of the Spirit of truth....
Paragraph 26 continues: "In the moral catechesis of the Apostles, besides exhortations and directions
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claims of the revisionist theologians, noting that since Vatican II, "there have developed
certain interpretations of Christian morality which are not consistent with 'sound
teaching. ",361 After referring to the extravagant emphasis on individual autonomy in
contemporary moral discourse, the encyclical condemns the work of moral theologians
who reject the existence of absolute moral norms.362 It states: "No one can fail to see
that such an interpretation of the autonomy of human reason involves positions
incompatible with Catholic teaching."
363
Veritatis Splendor restates the traditional Thomistic definition of the natural law as
the participation in the eternal law by the use of reason.364 It rejects arguments by
revisionists contending that the traditional approach focuses too much on physicalism,
i.e. the biological nature of acts such as contraception and direct sterilization, rather
than on the historical and social context of such acts.365  In rebuttal, it states: "A
doctrine which dissociates the moral act from the bodily dimensions of its exercise is
contrary to the teaching of Scripture and Tradition."366 It also reaffirms the existence
of moral absolutes, "negative precepts of the natural law," governing human conduct
that are valid always and everywhere. 367 Noting that some moral theologians have
emphasized the cultural context in order to question the immutability of specific moral
norms, it responds: "There is something in man that transcends those cultures." 368 It
condemns an approach that legitimizes departures from moral norms as so-called
"pastoral solutions." 369  While acknowledging the important role of conscience, it
emphasizes the role of the teachings of the Church in forming the consciences of
Christians.
37 °
Veritatis Splendor emphatically rejects the arguments of moral theologians who
would judge the morality of acts "on the basis of a technical calculation between the
'premoral' or 'physical' goods and evils which actually result from the action." 37 1
Likewise, it rejects teleological ethical approaches, such as proportionalism, that
emphasize the maximization of goods and the minimization of evils. 372 It notes that
while the foreseeable consequences of an act may mitigate its gravity, it can never "alter
its moral species." 373 It rejects the proportionalist argument that the morality of an act
cannot be determined solely by its object and must take account of the "totality of the
foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned.'374 Instead, Veritatis
Splendor reemphasizes the continuing validity of the traditional Thomistic teaching that
connected to specific historical and cultural situations, we find an ethical teaching with precise rules of
behaviour." Id.
361. Id. para. 29 (emphasis in original).
362. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 349, para. 35-37.
363. Id. at para. 37.
364. Id. at para. 43.
365. Id. at para. 47.
366. Id. at para. 49 (emphasis in original).
367. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 349, para. 52.
368. Id. at para. 53.
369. Id. at para. 56.
370. Id. at para. 64.
371. Id. at para. 65.
372. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 349, at para. 74-75.
373. Id. at para. 77.
374. Id. at para. 79.
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"the morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the 'object'
rationally chosen by the deliberate will."375 It reiterates that acts such as contraception
and direct abortion are acts that are intrinsically evil regardless of circumstances.
376
Finally, as to the phenomenon of public dissent from the Magisterium by moral
theologians, it states: "Moral theologians are to set forth the Church's teaching and to
give, in the exercise of their ministry, the example of loyal assent, both internal and
external, to the Magisterium 's teaching in the areas of both dogma and morality."
' 377
Evangelium Vitae was written to combat the prevalence of a "culture of death" that
is "excessively concerned with efficiency" and accordingly devalues the lives of those
who impose burdens on others. 378 The encyclical even refers to the unleashing of a
"conspiracy against life" that has undermined the family as well as "relations between
peoples and States."379 Specific mention is made of the expenditure of large sums of
money to produce pharmaceuticals designed to accomplish abortions without medical
assistance.
380
Evangelium Vitae reasserts the traditional teaching on the immorality of
contraception, and condemns a "contraceptive mentality" that strengthens the
temptation to resort to abortion when an unwanted life is conceived. 381  While
acknowledging that abortion and contraception are distinctly different, the latter
undermining the procreative nature of sexual act and the former destroying human life,
it refers to them "as fruits of the same tree" that are "rooted in a hedonistic
mentality."'382 It expresses alarm at the fact that "attacks on life are spreading" and
receive widespread and powerful support from a broad consensus on the part of society"
as well as "widespread legal approval and the involvement of certain sectors of health
care personnel."
' 383
Evangelium Vitae traces the current attacks on human life to a concept of freedom
that places an excessive emphasis on individual autonomy and "emancipation from all
forms of tradition and authority." 384 It refers to an ongoing struggle between a "culture
of life" and a "culture of death."' 385 Furthermore, referring to the "unspeakable crime of
abortion," it condemns all direct abortions. 386 It further emphasizes that human life is
to be protected from the time of fertilization of the ovum. 387 As to abortion, the Holy
Father, speaking infallibly, concludes: "Therefore by the authority which Christ
conferred upon Peter and his Successors, in communion with the Bishops... I declare
that direct abortion, that is abortion willed as an end or as means, always constitutes a
375. Id. at para. 78.
376. Id. at para. 80.
377. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 349, at para. 110.
378. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 350, at para. 12.
379. Id.
380. Id. at para. 13.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 349, at para. 17.
384. Id. at para. 19-20.
385. Id. at para. 21.
386. Id. at para. 58.
387. Id. at para. 60.
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grave moral disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being."
388
Finally, as to dissenting theologians, the encyclical enjoins them "never be so
grievously irresponsible as to betray the truth and their own mission by proposing
personal ideas contrary to the Gospel of Life as faithfully presented and interpreted by
the Magisterium."
389
E. The Ethical and Religious Directives
The traditional Catholic natural law approach is reflected in the Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals [ERD], a set of norms adopted by the
NCCB and updated in 2001. 390 "The directives describe procedures that are judged
morally wrong by the [NCCB] and the United States Catholic Conference." 391 Those
procedures judged morally wrong include contraception, 392 direct sterilization 393 and
direct abortion. 394  Thus artificial contraception is deemed immoral notwithstanding
compelling reasons for limiting fertility. Direct surgical sterilizations are forbidden
notwithstanding substantial clinical reasons for permanently curtailing the capacity of
particular patients to become pregnant. And direct abortions are forbidden
notwithstanding the potential effect of the pregnancy on the life or health of the mother.
This traditional natural law approach may be seen in all versions of the ERD.
The ERD apply to Catholic hospitals within a particular diocese upon their
adoption and promulgation by the local bishop. 395  In the United States, conformity
with the ERD may provide a litmus test for determining the degree to which a hospital
is serious about preserving its Catholic mission.396 Indeed, the thrust of the ERD is to
require Catholic hospitals to preserve their distinctively Catholic mission.397  If the
ERD are not observed by a particular Catholic health care facility, then the local bishop
could withdraw recognition of the hospital's identity as a Catholic institution.398 This
388. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 349, at para. 62.
389. Id. at para. 82.
390. United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, supra note 21. See also White, Hospitals Sponsored
by the Roman Catholic Church, supra note 21, at 216 noting: "The moral responsibility of Catholic health
care is outlined in the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services."
391. Id. at 216. In 2002, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the United States Catholic
Conference merged to become the United States Catholic Bishops Conference.
392. United States Conference for Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, at 28.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 26.
395. "[T]he diocesan bishop is responsible for applying the Ethical and Religious Directives in his
diocese." Francis Morrisey, Toward Juridic Personality, HEALTH PROGRESS, July-Aug. 2001, available at
http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP0107&ARTICLE=J.
396. Maida and Cafardi state:
In the field of health care, the U.S. Bishops, exercising this faith authority, have approved the
Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Facilities. These directives.., are applied to
specific situations under the guidance of each diocesan bishop with that bishop's diocese. It is a
person's acceptance of the Catholic faith that makes these Directives binding. A health care
facility could not call itself "Catholic" and ignore these Directives. They have been defined by the
bishops as being the essence of "Catholic" health care.
ADAM J. MAIDA & NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI, CHURCH PROPERTY, CHURCH FINANCES, AND CHURCH-RELATED
CORPORATIONS 57 (1984).
397. Id.
398. Jean deBlois & Kevin O'Rourke, Introducing the Revised Directives: What Do They Mean for
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in turn could result in closure of the facility if it is owned either by the diocese or a
religious order. If it is owned by an independent Board of Trustees, the hospital could
continue its operations, but not as a Catholic facility.
399
A code of medical ethics for hospitals in the United States was initially a project of
the Catholic Hospital Association, the forerunner of today's Catholic Health
Association (CHA).400 Father Moulnier, the first president of the CHA believed that it
was essential that Catholic hospitals meet American College of Surgeon's (ACS)
standards. 401 Thus the code of ethics was first adopted by the CHA in 1921 at the
height of the standardization movement in order to defuse a controversy over the role of
the ACS in accrediting Catholic hospitals.402 Some Catholic physicians believed that
accreditation by ACS portended greater secular control over Catholic hospitals and
threatened their religious mission.403 In response to these concerns, Moulnier wanted to
adopt a code of ethics in order to calm "fears that Catholic moral principles could be
jeopardized by the secular accrediting agency."'404  Eventually, the 1921 Code was
"accepted verbatim by many dioceses, and slightly modified by others." 40 5 The norms
prohibited destruction of fetal life and sterilization.
40 6
The 1921 code was replaced by a revised code entitled the Code of Ethical and
Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals, which was published in 1949 by the
Catholic Hospital Association. 407  Since Catholic hospitals were collaborating more
frequently with pubic agencies, it was deemed necessary "to articulate clear positions
on issues such as birth control and contraceptive methods." 40 8 "The new code was also
broader than its predecessor, addressing issues such as x-ray treatments, artificial
insemination, and birth control information.' 4° 9  The 1949 ERD prohibited direct
abortions even when necessary to save the life of the mother. 41 Direct sterilization was
also forbidden.
4 11
The 1949 ERD was not "an authorized version" and some contended that in
practice they resulted in "geographical morality" particularly with respect to the moral
permissibility of the performance of contraceptive sterilizations in Catholic hospitals.
4 1
2
Theologians at the time disagreed over the morality of sterilizations that were
Catholic Healthcare?, HEALTH PROGRESS, April 1995, available at
http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP9504&ARTICLE=D.
399. Id.
400. KAUFFMAN, supra note 318, at 169.




405. Kevin D. O'Rourke, et al., A Brief History, HEALTH PROGRESS, Nov.-Dec. 2001, available at
http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HPOI I I&ARTICLE=G.
406. Id.
407. CATHOLIC HosP. ASS'N OF THE U.S. & CAN., ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC
HOSPITALS (1949).
408. KAUFFMAN, supra note 318, at 252.
409. Sharon Pentland, What's Past is Prologue, HEALTH PROGRESS, Jan.-Feb. 1995, available at
http:www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP9501& ARTICLE=O.
410. CATHOLIC Hosp. ASS'Nsupra note 407, at 4.
411. KELLY, supra note 268, at 184.
412. deBlois & Rourke, supra note 398, at 19.
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performed for clinical reasons to avoid pathologies that could result from future
pregnancies. 413 In some dioceses, such sterilizations were deemed morally permissible
if a future pregnancy could result in serious health problems in a woman, while others
treated them as direct sterilizations and forbade them.4 14 In the 1960s, due to the
influence of revisionist theologians, bishops in some dioceses interpreted the ERD to
permit direct sterilizations and the distribution of contraceptives in Catholic
hospitals.4 15 "Because of the problem of "geographical morality," the CHA asked the
NCCB to compose one set of directives for the whole country.
4 16
In 1971, the NCCB approved a revised version of the ERD.4 17 The revision was
primarily motivated by the need to address issues such as the provision of sterilization,
contraception, and artificial insemination in Catholic hospitals in the aftermath of
challenges to traditional teaching in these areas.4 18  The revised directives were
formulated and adopted during a time of vocal dissent from Humana Vitae, the Papal
encyclical restating traditional church teaching on artificial birth control that was issued
in 1968. 4 19 Many Catholic theologians were sharply critical of the 1971 ERD. 42 Upon
publication of the 1971 ERD, noted ethicist Richard A. McCormick, S.J., attacked them
as being too rigid because they prohibited the provision of sterilization, contraception,
and artificial insemination in Catholic hospitals.42 1  McCormick and others also
criticized the 1971 ERD for its failure to take account of the pluralistic nature of
contemporary society and the changing nature of Catholic hospitals.422 Instead, they
advocated relaxation of the traditional prohibition on material cooperation with evil so
that Catholic hospitals could provide the reproductive health services prohibited by
Catholic teaching.
423
Despite the negative reaction of many well-known theologians, the NCCB
overwhelmingly voted to approve the 1971 version of the ERD.424 The subsequent
widespread adoption of the 1971 version of the ERD by local bishops was further
encouraged by the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision and the fact that, as noted by John
Cardinal Krol, Archbishop of Philadelphia and President of the NCCB, Catholic
hospitals might not be able to take advantage of recently adopted conscience clause
legislation unless rules were in place that prohibited them from performing abortions.
425
Widespread adoption was also encouraged by the issuance in October of 1972 of an
injunction by a U.S. District Court in Montana that enjoined a Catholic hospital from
413. Id.
414. Id.
415. O'Rourke, Kopfensteiner & Hamel, supra note 405.
416. Id.
417. KAUFFMAN, supra note 318, at 290.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 289.
420. O'Rourke, Kopfensteiner & Hamel, supra note 405.
421. McCormick, supra note 319, discussed in KAUFFMAN, MINISTRY AND MEANING, supra note 318, at
290.
422. KAUFFMAN, supra note 318, at 291.
423. Id. at 290-91.
424. O'Rourke, Kopfensteiner & Hamel, supra note 405.
425. Id. at n. 14 citing to Letter of John Cardinal Krol, President of NCCB, March 7,1973 (private papers
of Rev. Kevin O'Rourke, OP).
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prohibiting a physician from performing a tubal ligation on a patient.
426
In a 1972 article in the Linacre Quarterly, Thomas J. O'Donnell, S.J., a consultant
who was involved in preparation of the 1971 ERD, responded to the criticism of the
ERD, noting: "The controversy is basically about the teaching of the Catholic Church
on abortion and contraception." 427 Father O'Donnell further noted that the controversy
over the 1971 ERD is not a controversy over the question of what the Church teaches on
abortion and contraception, but rather a controversy over whether those teachings
should be followed by Catholic institutions.
428
As to abortion, the 1971 ERD reaffirmed the traditional prohibition of all direct
abortions. Directive 12 of the 1971 ERD specifically prohibited "the directly intended
destruction of a viable fetus."'429  Traditional prohibitions on contraception and
sterilization were also reaffirmed by the 1971 ERD. Directive 18 of the 1971 ERD
prohibited contraceptive sterilization "whether permanent or temporary." 430  Also
prohibited is: "every action which, either in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its
accomplishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether
as an ends or as a means, to render procreation impossible."
' 431
A revised and expanded text of the ERD was "developed by the Committee on
Doctrine of the NCCB and approved as the national code by the full body of bishops at
their November 1994 General Meeting." 4 32 The Preamble to the 1994 ERD notes the
426. Id. at n.14 citing to Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., No. c-1090 (D. Mont. Oct. 25, 1972).
Subsequently, however, the court ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the claim on the merits in light
of changes in federal law in reaction to its earlier injunction. Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 369 F.Supp. 948
(Mont. 1973), affd., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975). In a footnote, the court quotes from the legislative history
to P.L. 93-45; 87 Stat. 91, Section 401(b), the statute prohibits a court from finding that a hospital receiving
Hill Burton money is acting under color of state law, as follows:
The background for subsection (b) of section 401 of the bill is an injunction issued in November
1972 by the United States District Court for the district of Montana in Taylor v. St. Vincent's
Hospital. The court enjoined St. Vincent's Hospital, located in Billings, Montana, from
prohibiting Mrs. Taylor's physician from performing ... a sterilization procedure on her during the
delivery of her baby by Caesarean section.
The suit to enjoin the hospital was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (which authorizes civil actions
for redress of deprivation of civil rights by a person acting under color of law) and 28 U.S.C. §
1343 (which grants United States district courts jurisdiction of actions (authorized by another law)
to redress deprivation, under color of any State law, of a Constitutional right)....
Section (b) of 401 would prohibit a court or a public official, such as the Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, from using receipt of assistance under the three laws amended by the bill.
..as a basis for requiring an individual or institution to perform or assist in the performance of
sterilization procedures or abortions, if such action would be contrary to religious beliefs or moral
conviction.
In recommending the enactment of this provision, the Committee expresses no opinion as to the
validity of the Taylor decision.
Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 369 F. Supp. at 950, n. 1, quoting from H.R. No. 93-227; 1973 U.S. Code &
Cong. & Admin. News 1553.
427. Thomas J. O'Donnell, S.J., The Directives: A Crisis of Faith, 39 LINACRE Q. 139 (Aug. 1972).
428. Id. at 146.
429. Nat'l Conference of Catholic Bishops, ETHICAL & RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH
FACILITIES Directive 12 (1971) reprinted in O'DONNELL, MEDICINE AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY, supra note
315, at 314.
430. Nat'l Conference of Catholic Bishops, ETHICAL & RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH
FACILITIES Directive 18 (1971) reprinted in O'DONNELL, MEDICINE AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY, supra note
315, at 315.
431. Id. at Directive 19.
432. Nat'l Conference of Catholic Bishops, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH
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"extraordinary change" that has taken place in health care in the United States and in
the Church.433 Among the changes noted are "technological advances" as well as
"significant changes in religious orders and congregations" as well as "the increased
involvement of lay men and women."434 As noted by commentators Sister Jean deBlois
and Father Kevin O'Rourke, the drafters of the 1994 ERD as well as the bishops were
well aware of the fact that by this time many of those "serving as trustees,
administrators, or healthcare professionals in Catholic facilities are not Catholic.
' 435
Accordingly, they clearly intended that Catholics as well as non-Catholics with
management roles in Catholic healthcare facilities should administer them in
accordance with the ERD.
436
The necessity of taking specific steps to preserve the religious identity of Catholic
health care institutions was among the most important goals of the 1994 ERD. Its
Introduction recognizes that laypersons and many non-Catholics are involved in
Catholic health care.437 There is also a realization that their participation is essential for
the continuation of the Catholic health care mission. 438 Perhaps not coincidentally, the
Introduction also recognized the unique responsibility of the local bishop in preserving
the religious identity of Catholic health care in his diocese: "These responsibilities will
require that Catholic health care providers and the diocesan bishop engage in ongoing
communication on ethical and pastoral matters that require his attention." 439 Certainly,
it was appropriate that the role of the bishop be emphasized in light of the continuing
decline in the numbers of religious involved in the health care ministry. Indeed, greater
involvement of the bishop in the supervision of the health care ministry could be viewed
as an essential means of preserving Catholic identity in such an environment.
There was also a recognition that adherence to the directives is necessary for the
purpose of maintaining Catholic identity. In order to reinforce the importance of the
1994 ERD in preserving religious identity, Directive 5 required Catholic institutions to
adopt them as policy, to require adherence to them by employees and the medical staff,
and to provide instruction on them for administrators and staff members. 44  There was
a specific requirement that "[e]mployees of a Catholic health care institution must
respect and uphold the religious mission of the institution and adhere to these
directives." 44 1 Moreover, in an apparent response to critics who have argued that
Catholic health care institutions in a pluralist society have the obligation to provide
procedures that violate Catholic moral teaching, the introduction to the section on social
responsibility specifically stated: "Catholic health care does not offend the rights of
CARES SERVICES (1995) (taken from the inside cover of the pamphlet version published by the United States
Catholic Conference).
433. Id. at I pmbl.
434. Id.
435. deBlois & O'Rourke, supra note 398, at 21.
436. Id.
437. Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, Introduction I at 4.
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, at 7.
441. Id. at 8.
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individual conscience by refusing to provide or permit medical procedures that are
judged morally wrong by the teaching authority of the Church.' 42
The 1994 ERD specifically addressed the care to be given to victims of sexual
assault. The 1971 ERD had treated the use of curettage of the endometrium after rape
as the equivalent of abortion, and thereby prohibited it.443 But Directive 36 of the 1994
ERD recognized that the victim of a rape should be able to defend herself against
conception and authorized treatment with medication to "prevent ovulation, sperm
capacitation or fertilization." 4 4 The Directive further prohibited "treatments that have
as their purpose or direct effect the removal, destruction, or interference with the
implantation of a fertilized ovum."445  In an accompanying footnote, there was a
recommendation "that a sexually assaulted woman be advised of the ethical restrictions
that prevent Catholic hospitals from using abortifacient procedures."'446 There was also
a reference to guidelines issued by the Pennsylvania Catholic Conference for the
treatment of victims of sexual assault.
447
The treatment of abortion was unchanged from the 1971 ERD: direct abortions
were never permitted.448 As in the 1971 ERD, discussed supra, there was a specific
admonition that Catholic hospitals are not to provide abortion service "even based upon
the principle of material cooperation." 449 And in addition, in the 1994 ERD, there was a
further admonition concerning the "need to be concerned about the danger of scandal in
any association with abortion providers. ' 45° In addition, and perhaps in recognition of
the widespread prevalence of abortion in the wake of Roe v. Wade, Catholic health care
providers were encouraged to provide "compassionate physical, psychological, moral
and spiritual care to those persons who have suffered from the trauma of abortion."
'45 1
Early induction of labor, post-viability, was permitted for "proportionate
reasons. ' 452 This topic was not addressed in the 1971 ERD. Directive 52 of the 1994
ERD prohibited Catholic health care institutions from promoting or condoning
contraceptive practices, and encouraged them to provide instruction on natural family
planning.453 This provision was more succinct than the treatment of the matter in the
1971 ERD.4 5 4 The reference to the promotion of natural family planning in the context
of the prohibition on promoting or condoning contraception may represent the
442. Id. at 7.
443. Directive 24, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH FACILITIES (1971),
reprinted in O'Donnell, MEDICINE AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY, supra note 315, at 316-17.
444. Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, at 16.
445. Id.
446. Id. at 31 n. 19.
447. Id. citing to Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, Guidelines for Catholic Hospitals Treating Victims of
Sexual Assault, 22 ORIGINS 810 (1993).
448. Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, at 19.
449. Compare Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, directive 45 at 19; with Directive 12,
ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH FACILITIES (1971), reprinted in O'Donnell,
MEDICINE AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY, supra note 315, at 314.
450. Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, at 19.
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 20.
454. Cf. Directive 19, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH FACILITIES (1971),
reprinted in O'DONNELL, MEDICINE AND CHRISTIAN MORALITY, supra note 315, at 315.
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recognition that by this time contraceptives were being routinely prescribed and
dispensed in professional office buildings owned by Catholic hospitals.
The treatment of sterilization was similar to prior versions of the ERD. Directive 53
prohibited "direct sterilization, whether permanent or temporary" in Catholic health
care institutions.455 Procedures that induce sterility were, however, permitted where
"their direct effect is cure or alleviation of a present and serious pathology and a simpler
treatment is not available." 456  These provisions prohibited implicitly all direct
sterilizations regardless of a possible justification based on the impact of future
pregnancies on the woman's health. Another innovation in the 1994 ERD was the
inclusion of a section dealing specifically with the formation of new partnerships among
Catholic and non-Catholic health care institutions. 45 7  Concerns about the risk of
scandal arising from such partnerships motivated the adoption of this section, at least in
part. 458 Accordingly, Directive 67 required prior consultation with the local bishop
before entering into partnerships that could contain "serious consequences for the
identity or reputation of Catholic health care services, or entail the high risk of
scandal. ' 459  Directive 68 required that partnerships that will affect the identity or
religious mission of Catholic health care institutions "must respect Church teaching.
' 46 °
It further provided that "[d]iocesan bishops and other church authorities should be
involved as such partnerships are developed, and the diocesan bishop should give the
appropriate authorization before they are completed." 461  If the partnership was
involved in activities that would violate Church norms, then the Catholic institution was
required to limit its participation "in accord with the moral principles governing
cooperation."'462 It was further emphasized that the possibility of scandal may, in some
circumstances, preclude cooperation that would otherwise be morally appropriate.
463
Accompanying this new section on partnerships was an appendix setting out the
principles governing cooperation.
464
In the spring of 2001, the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) asked
the NCCB to revise Part Six of the 1994 ERD.4 6 5 The request was motivated by
specific concerns regarding the misapplication of the principle of cooperation in three
arrangements entered into by Catholic health care institutions in the United States.
4 6 6
The CDF "sought a clarification of the distinction between material and formal
cooperation so as to exclude any possibility of proportionalist interpretations of the
principle. ' '467 At its June 2001 meeting, the Catholic bishops in the United States
455. Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, at 20.
456. Id.
457. Id. at 25-27.
458. Id. at 26.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, at 26.
462. Id. at 27.
463. Id
464. Id. at 29.






approved revisions of the 1994 ERD.4 6 8  The revisions were not extensive, but,
nonetheless, may hold a significant impact for collaborative arrangements between
Catholic and non-Catholic institutions.469 Indeed, the revisions were occasioned by the
Vatican's concerns about the "culpable cooperation" of Catholic health care institutions
in the immoral conduct of non-Catholic institutions.
470
In recent years, a number of Catholic hospitals were accused of attempting to
circumvent implementation of the ERD by cooperating with non-Catholic health care
providers to provide reproductive services prohibited under the ERD. In 2001, the ERD
was modified to make it more difficult for Catholic hospitals to utilize cooperative
arrangements to continue to provide reproductive services such as sterilizations that
hospitals would not be permitted to provide directly under the ERD. This revision was
occasioned by the Brackenridge Hospital case in Austin, Texas, and other similar
occurrences.
In 1995, the City of Austin entered into a thirty-year lease of Brackenridge Hospital
to Seton Health Care, a Catholic health care system owned by the Daughters of Charity
that later became part of Ascension Health.471 At the time the lease was entered into,
Seton agreed to continue to provide sterilizations, contraception (including emergency
contraception) and abortion referrals at the facility.4 72 Seton personnel did not provide
the services; a separate company provided them under contract with the city within the
leased hospital.
473
Subsequently, in 2000 the local Bishop Coadjutor Gregory Aymond announced that
the Vatican was dissatisfied with the arrangements at Brackenridge regarding
reproductive health services and that Seton and the City of Austin were discussing
modification of the lease provisions.474 In June of 2001, Ascension Health notified the
City that it would no longer provide sterilizations at Brackenridge.4 75  This
announcement came shortly before the United States Catholic Bishops tightened up the
Directives to prohibit arrangements like the Brackenridge lease.
476
Although the treatments of abortion,477 contraception, and sterilization are
468. United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 21.
469. Peter J. Cataldo & John M. Haas, Institutional Cooperation: The ERDs, HEALTH PROGRESS (Nov.-
Dec. 2002), available at http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSCONT.ASP?ISSUE=HP021 I&ARTICLE=L.
470. Id.
471. Mary Ann Roser, City-Seton Arrangement Likely to Survive Dispute; No One Else Seems Willing to
Run Financially Risky Hospital, AUSTrN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, Nov. 3, 2001, available at 2001 WL
4585626.
472. Kim Sue Lia Perkes, Bishops to Weigh Hospital Services: Proposal to Enforce Limits on
Reproductive Services Could Affect Brackenridge, AUSTN-AMERiCAN STATESMAN, Oct. 26, 2000, available
at 2000 WL 7342856.
473. Id.
474. Kim Sue Lia Perkes, Hospital Issues Won't Be on Bishop's Agenda, AUSTIN AMERICAN-
STATESMAN, Nov. 10, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7343472.
475. Texas Hospital Hit By Church Move, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL
9418842.
476. Id.
477. Compare Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, directives 45-49 at 19-20, with United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, directives 45-49 at 26-27.
478. Compare Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, directive 52 at 20, with United States
Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, directive 52 at 28.
479. Compare Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 432, directive 53 at 20, with United States
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unchanged from the 1994 ERD, the Appendix contained in the 1994 ERD, "The
Principles Governing Cooperation", was removed from the 2001 ERD in an apparent
response to the Brackenridge case and other similar occurrences. The 2001 edition
notes that the Appendix was omitted because "the brief articulation of the principles of
cooperation that was presented there did not sufficiently forestall certain possible
misinterpretations and in practice gave rise to problems in concrete applications of theS•.,,480
principles. In addition, a new directive, Directive 70, was adopted that provides
"Catholic health care organizations are not permitted to engage in immediate material
cooperation in actions that are intrinsically immoral, such as abortion, euthanasia,
assisted suicide, and direct sterilization.
48 1
F. Catholic Identity
The concept of Catholic identity is related to the canonical status of Catholic health
care ministries and the continuing sponsorship of those ministries by religious orders.
482
There is no specific reference in the 1983 Code of Canon Law to health care
institutions. 483 And there are no guidelines in the Code for determining the Catholic
identity of healthcare institutions.484 In fact, Catholic identity is not a term of art under
canon law.4 85 On the other hand, "[t]he name or title 'Catholic' cannot be used without
the consent of the competent church authority." 486 The diocesan Bishop determines
whether a particular hospital is considered Catholic, and the determination of Catholic
identity carries with it an element of "accountability to ecclesiastical authorities.
' 487
The religious orders that sponsor hospitals do so "as representatives of the Church itself
under the authoritative directives of the canon law" and "[t]hus are not free to pick and
chose among moral imperatives. ' '488 Moreover, "canon law positively prohibits officers
Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, directive 53 at 28.
480. Nat'l Conf. of Catholic Bishops, supra note 21, at 36.
481. Id. at 36.
482. "Sponsorship" has been defined as:
[A] reservation of canonical control by the juridic person/sponsor that founded and/or sustains an
incorporated apostolate that remains canonically a part of the church entity. This retention of
control need not be such as to create civil law liability on the part of the sponsor for corporate acts
or omissions but should be enough for the canonical stewards of the sponsoring organization to
meet their canonical obligations of faith and administration regarding the activities of the
incorporated apostolate.
JORDAN HITE, A PRIMER ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE JURIDIC PERSONS: APPLICATIONS TO THE CATHOLIC
HEALTH CARE MINISTRY 37 (2000), quoted in Daniel C. Conlin, Sponsorship at the Crossroads: Religious
Institutes Must Consider the Direction in Which They Will Go, HEALTH PROGRESS (July/Aug. 2001),
available at http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP0107&ARTICLE=I.
483. Francis G. Morrisey, Trustees and Canon Law, HEALTH PROGRESS (Nov.-Dec. 2002), available at
http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP021 1&ARTICLE=G.
484. Francis G. Morrisey, Catholic Identity in a Challenging Environment, HEALTH PROGRESS (Nov.-
Dec. 1999), available at http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASP?ISSUE=HP99 11 &ARTICLE=D.
485. HITE, supra note 482, at 13.
486. HITE, supra note 482, at 13 (citing to Canon 300, THE CODE OF CANON LAW: A TEXT AND
COMMENTARY 245 (1985)).
487. Kenneth R. White & James W. Begun, How Does Catholic Hospital Sponsorship Affect Services
Provided, 35 INQUIRY 398 (Winter 1998/1999), available at Proquest: http://gateway.
proquest.com/openurl?ctx-ver+S39.88-2003resid+xri:PDQ&rft val fmt+ori:fmt:kev:mtx:joumnal&genre=
article&rftid=xri:PQD:DID=000000039310383.
488. Bassett, supra note 8, at 494.
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and directors of church-affiliated hospitals from disguising their identity or allowing
that identity to be eroded through contractual or personnel management decisions."
489
It is the diocesan bishop that determines whether a particular institution within his
490diocese has lost its Catholic identity. Nonetheless, "aside from the use of the name
'Catholic,"' Catholic identity is more "a matter of public perception, rather than church
law."
491
Typically, in the United States, Catholic hospitals are owned by non-profit
corporations that maintain a relationship of sponsorship with their founding religious
institute. Naturally, the shift to lay management in these corporations, along with their
affiliations with non-Catholic institutions, has inevitably raised questions as to what it
means to be a Catholic hospital. Moreover, with the continuing decline in vocations, it
has been said that the Church's "'control' over the health care apostolate is... fast giving
way to an 'influence' approach." 492 As a result of these changes, when it comes to
questions of Catholic identity, there has been an increased emphasis on the role of the
local bishop in supervising health care institutions and on compliance with the ERD.
493
Previously, bishops could rely "on religious congregations to operate and oversee
their health care ministry" in accordance with Catholic ethical and moral standards.
49 4
When religious orders directly owned and operated their health care ministries, the
bishop could exercise control through his "personal authority over particular
congregation members." 495  With the changing relationship between the religious
congregations and their health care enterprises, and the increasing role of the laity, this
type of personal control is no longer feasible.496 Instead, the preservation of Catholic
identity in health care institutions must rely more on normative standards, i.e., the
adherence of the institution to the norms set forth in the ERD as interpreted and applied
by the local bishop.
497
Ultimately, the preservation of Catholic identity requires continuing "commitment
to the moral teachings and ethical norms of the church." 4 9 8  And this may be
problematic because "[t]hese are at times, counter cultural stances, witnessing to respect
for the integrity of human life in the face of abortion, sterilization, assisted suicide,
489. Id. at 496.
490. Sharon Holland, Sponsorship and the Vatican, HEALTH PROGRESS (July-Aug. 2001), available at
http://www.chausa.org/PUBS/PUBSART.ASPISSUE=HP0107&ARTICLE=K.
491. HITE, supra note 482, at 13.
492. MICHAEL DENNIS McGowAN, THE CANONICAL STATUS OF CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE FACILITIES IN
THE PROVINCE OF NEW BRUNSWICK IN LIGHT OF RECENT PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT LEGISLATION 95
(2000).
493. Id. at 175.
494. BEVERLY KATHRINE DUNN, S.P., SPONSORSHIP OF CATHOLIC INSTITUTIONS, PARTICULARLY
HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS, BY THE SISTERS OF PROVIDENCE IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 183 (1995)
(unpublished dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Canon Law, Saint Paul University, Ottawa, Canada, in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Canon Law) (on file with the author).
495. Id.
496. Id. at 184.
497. Id. In a 1975 publication, Rev. Adam Maida, now Cardinal Archbishop of Detroit, recommended
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euthanasia, and certain areas of research and experimentation. ' 499 Unfortunately, while
all Catholic institutions "subscribe to the directives in theory, not all follow them in
practice." 500  Nonetheless, the litmus test for the Catholic identity of hospitals in the
United States should be whether the hospital follows and implements the ERD as
interpreted and applied by the local Bishop in its day-to-day operations.
The sponsor, typically a religious order, has the responsibility of preserving the
Catholic identity of its institutions and safeguarding the property used to further their
mission.50 1 In the 1980s, the focus shifted to the mission as the sponsoring orders
attempted to clarify the fundamental values of Catholic. health care and develop
programs to inculcate those values in their lay employees. 50 2  "In many Catholic
healthcare organizations, executive positions exist to promote and monitor the values of
the sponsor. ' 5° 3  Today, as the membership ranks of sponsoring orders continue to
decline, there is increased attention directed toward the formation of laypersons as
sponsor representatives. 504  In addition, since religious sponsors have delegated many
of their powers to the governing boards of the health care institutions, the role of
members of the corporate boards of trustees in ensuring faithfulness to the Catholic
mission is receiving greater emphasis. 50 5 It is not, however, clear at this time that these
attempts will be sufficient to preserve the identity and mission of Catholic health care
institutions, particularly in light of the legal assault by liberal choice groups and the
complexity of current health care systems.
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To use an example from the health care field, when public juridic persons sponsor health care
institutions, they are obliged to see that the institution is operated in conformity with the teachings
of the Church. This is the case whether the health care facility is an unincorporated program of the
religious sponsor, as are many old age or long term care homes, or whether it is separately
incorporated, as most hospitals are.... The natural persons who oversee the affairs of the public
juridic persons that sponsor health care institutions are obliged by the canon law to see that the
teachings are followed in the activity of the sponsored institution (an affirmative responsibility)
and that the sponsored institution does not act contrary to the teachings of the Church in its
corporate activities.
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505. Morrisey, supra note 484. Morrisey states:
From a canonical perspective, the primary duty of trustees is to ensure that the institutions under
their supervision operate in accordance with the teaching, discipline, and laws of the Roman
Catholic Church. This is to be done, however, taking into account the mission, vision, and values
of the system they represent. These values are usually spelled out in the corporate documents or
statutes governing the institution and its sponsors.
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506. One commentator has noted:
Health care systems of the size and scale constructed over the last five years make sponsorship
influence difficult to achieve. In cosponsored ministries and in the new PJP [public juridic person]
structures, leadership must be concerned about the evolution of Catholic culture and values.
Sponsors at the local level still serve a powerful role in a practical and symbolic sense. In many




Catholic hospitals are in a difficult situation: if they are to survive as distinctively
Catholic institutions, then they must continue to emphasize their Catholic identity
including their adherence to the ERD. As evidenced by mandatory contraceptive
coverage and emergency contraception laws, however, there is recent trend toward the
adoption of laws that may undermine the ability of Catholic hospitals to maintain their
commitment to the ERD. As a legal and political matter, it is becoming increasingly
difficult for Catholic hospitals to claim exemption from laws of general application that
may require them to act in violation of Catholic teaching. Catholic hospitals could
bolster their claim to statutory, if not constitutional protection, from such laws by
becoming more pervasively Catholic. And it may be easier to argue for legislative
exemption from such laws if Catholic institutions are generally perceived to be serious
about their Catholic identity. But, on the other hand, emphasizing the distinctive
mission of Catholic hospitals may strengthen claims in legislatures that public funding
should be denied because of the sectarian nature of these hospitals.
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The religious orders that founded most Catholic hospitals are attempting to provide
spiritual formation to their lay employees who ultimately will be responsible for
maintaining the mission of the sponsoring order. They have foreseen the increasing
importance of the laity and engaged in concerted planning to maintain their Catholic
identity. In addition, the ERD provides a relatively clear set of norms that continue to
apply in Catholic health care systems and provide standards for maintaining their
Catholic identity. Indeed, Catholicity provides a distinctive brand in the health care
marketplace that has developed an appeal to Catholics and non-Catholics. Health care
institutions deal with life, death and suffering, and so the religious dimension of
Catholic hospitals may even enhance their position in the marketplace. Physicians and
nurses also view themselves as healers, and their interests readily align with the
religious mission of Catholic institutions. Many health care providers appreciate the
importance of the spiritual dimension of health care even if they are not Catholic.
This is not to say that there are no problems or difficulties in maintaining a Catholic
is known by virtue of the deep and abiding presence of the individual religious women. The
danger exists of negating the roots of inspiration in individual religious in favor of only a
programmatic approach to mission and ministry at the system level. Systematic approaches are
required in our complex health systems, but some things can be learned from the living
incarnations before us. For instance, we see that public trust is earned over decades; our
employees still tend to go to the trusted sister advisor despite the fact that she may have no formal
role, and if the sisters are not aligned with leadership, the leader will likely fail before the sisters
do. The deeper issue is about forming and sustaining a culture without eradicating its foundation.
David J. Nygren, Effective Governance in Complex Systems: With Sponsorship at a Crossroads, Navigating
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of Medicare and Medicaid funding for provision of non-medical nursing services received at religious non-
medical health care institutions against Establishment Clause challenge); Children's Healthcare Is a Legal
Duty, Inc. v. Min De Parle, 212 F.3d 1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 2000) (upholding the constitutionality of Medicare
and Medicaid funding for provision of non-medical nursing services received at religious, non-medical health
care institutions against Establishment Clause challenge).
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mission in health care institutions. At times, particularly with reference to the provision
of contraception and sterilization, some Catholic health care institutions in particular
circumstances have come dangerously close to abandoning a distinctively Catholic
approach. By tolerating widespread dissent by theologians from Humanae Vitae the
bishops in the United States may have unwittingly strengthened the hand of groups
seeking legislation that would force Catholic hospitals to violate the ERD. And
unfortunately, attempts by Catholic institutions to accommodate the prevailing culture
by providing contraception and sterilization through creative arrangements that
circumvent the ERD may further encourage attempts by those who seek legislation
requiring Catholic hospitals to provide a full range of reproductive health services.
The Catholic Church is the only major western institution that continues to adhere
to the belief that there is a universal moral law that provides specific absolute moral
norms concerning human reproduction that are binding at all times on all persons. The
sexual revolution has had a tremendous impact on the West, and the Catholic Church's
position today is definitely counter-cultural. Elites in the West, including a majority of
the Justices on the United States Supreme Court, have embraced an ethical relativism
that views individual autonomy in sexual matters as a primary means of self-discovery
and self-fulfillment. 508 In effect, this right of sexual self-fulfillment and a commitment
to tolerance brings an antinomian orientation that trumps traditional moral principles
that are viewed by these same elites as primitive and even malicious. 509  With this
cultural shift among elites, it is not clear that the secular liberal western state will
continue to permit the Catholic Church to continue to proclaim and effectuate its beliefs
on the intrinsic immorality of direct abortion, direct sterilization and contraception even
in its own institutions.
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If Catholic hospitals in the United States are not permitted to continue to follow the
ERD, and particularly their restrictions on the provision of reproductive health services,
the bishops will face a difficult dilemma. The continuing recognition of hospitals as
Catholic institutions, even though they are providing reproductive health care services
508. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003), in which the Court refers to an "emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex." In the same opinion, Justice Kennedy also quotes the infamous mystery
passage from Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992):
These matters [referring to 'marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education'] involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under the compulsion of
the State.
509. Cf Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This Court has no business
imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class from which the members of this court
are selected, pronouncing that 'animosity' toward homosexuality ... is evil.").
510. Cf Stephen L. Carter, Liberalism's Religion Problem, FIRST THINGS 121 (March 2002), available at
http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft0203/articles/carter.htm, noting:
The liberal state is uncomfortable with deep religious devotion-and, for the most part, so is its
product, liberal law. Religious belief is reduced to precise parity with all other forms of belief, an
act of leveling that is already threatening to religion itself. In practice, liberalism often reduces
religion to an even smaller role than other belief systems, seeking to limit or shut off its access to
the public square and often deriding the efforts of the religious to live the lives they think the Lord
requires when those efforts seem to conflict with other liberal goals.
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in violation of the specific norms of the ERD, will undoubtedly create a risk of scandal
among the faithful. 5 11 On the other hand, closure of these institutions or withdrawal of
recognition of their Catholic nature and the severing of any links with the local bishop
will substantially diminish the role of the Catholic Church in health care.
It is my hope that the Catholic hospitals in the United States will continue to adhere
to the ERD and promote a "Culture of Life" even in the face of challenges from a post-
Christian culture that embraces a "Culture of Death." It is also my hope that Catholic
hospitals will remain free to develop their own value-based model of health care free
from state and federal legislative mandates that may require them to violate the ERD.
But if this is not the case, then the path of resistance to such mandates may become
necessary. As the late Robert Cover noted, sometimes resistance to the state provides
the defining moment for a religion.5 12 It may be that in the future, Catholic health care
in the United States will be called upon to resist the "Culture of Death" even in the face
of state attempts to force Catholic hospitals to cooperate in providing immoral
procedures. In his last novel, The Thanatos Syndrome, Walker Percy articulates an
alternative vision for a marginalized Catholic health care ministry through the fictional
character of Father Rinaldo, an alcoholic priest who some regard as insane. Father
Smith's hospice was closed down for a time by medical authorities, but at its reopening
he pleads:
Listen to me, dear physicians, dear brothers, dear Qualitarians, abortionists,
enthusiasts! Do you know why you are going to listen to me? Because every last one
of you is a better man than I and you know it! And yet you like me. Every last one
of you knows me and what I am, a failed priest, an old drunk, who is only fit to do
one thing and to tell you one thing. You are good, kind, hardworking doctors, but
you like me nevertheless and I know that you will allow me to tell you one thing-
no, ask one thing-no, beg one thing of you. Please do this one favor for me, dear
doctors. If you have a patient, young or old, suffering, dying, afflicted, useless, born
or unborn, whom you for the best of reasons wish to put out of his misery-I beg
only one thing of you, dear doctors! Please send him to us. Don't kill them! We'll
take them-all of them! Please send them to us! I promise you, and I know that you
believe me, that we will take care of him, her-we will even call on you to help us
take care of them!-and you will not have to make such a decision. God will bless
you for it and you will offend no one except the Great Prince Satan, who rules the
world. That is all.
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